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The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s 
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium 
theory, which may provide useful information to Nevada’s state policymakers as they seek to 
address the state’s educated workforce needs via postsecondary governance reform. This study 
sought to explore the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors responded as 
they did and the context in which they responded by examining the life cycle of three unique 
higher education governance reform bills. Interviews with 12 policy actors and review of over 
150 public documents revealed three overarching themes: (1) public support of AJR 11 was 
insufficient to overcome a structure-induced equilibrium created by the Nevada Constitution; (2) 
the policy solution AB 331 offered was too extreme and complex to garner legislative support; 
and (3) perchance, unconventional tactics AJR 5 cosponsors employed in the legislative 
policymaking process of AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation that ultimately 
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Research has suggested America is “losing ground in postsecondary education relative to 
our competitors...increasing our supply of skilled labor is central to the vitality of the U.S. 
economy” (Carnevale & Rose, 2014, p. 13). Some states have attempted to address this loss 
through governance reform and policy means. For example, governors in California and 
Colorado have aimed to strengthen their statewide coordinating boards (Toppo, 2019). Similarly, 
the Nevada legislature is presently seeking greater oversight of their statewide higher education 
governing board. To be sure, states and their postsecondary governance entities play an essential 
role in facilitating public higher education performance and achieving important public priorities.  
The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education has suggested, “traditional 
decision-making entities, built for other times and other public purposes and based primarily on 
institutionally focused issues, will crowd out attention to critical public priorities” (2005, p. 3a). 
In Nevada, 62% of jobs will require postsecondary education beyond 2020 (Carnevale, Smith, & 
Strohl, 2013). At 55%, Nevada’s current average attainment level falls short in meeting its 
educated workforce needs (Carnevale et al., 2013). In contrast to many states, who over time 
have reformed their higher education governance structures through legislation (see McLendon, 
2003b), the state of Nevada has maintained its single state-level higher education governance 
system largely intact since its creation in 1864. While the legislature has marginally adjusted the 
number of regents and their term limits, they have not enacted legislation that reforms the higher 
education governance structure or changes its authority arrangement. Consequently, Nevada’s 
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single state-level governance structure for higher education exists today as it did in 1864 despite 
the state’s workforce needs and National Center’s call for change. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s 
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium 
theory. As previously illustrated, research has suggested Nevada falls short in meeting its 
educated workforce needs. A study of Nevada’s state-level policymaking process as it pertains to 
higher education governance reform legislation may provide useful information to Nevada’s 
state policymakers as they seek to address the state’s workforce deficiency via postsecondary 
governance reform.  
Research Questions 
The primary research question guiding this study was: How has the state of Nevada’s 
legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education 
governance entity? A secondary question asked: How is the legislative policymaking process of 
the ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to 
and/or different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly 
Bill 331, two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed?  
Overview of Literature  
Three bodies of literature helped establish a framework for examining how the state of 
Nevada’s legislative policymaking process has facilitated the preservation of its higher education 
governance entity. The first group introduced the role of states in higher education from a 
historical perspective. The second group examined state actors and how they have affected 
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public higher education. Finally, the last body of literature addressed state-level governance 
structures and their influence on higher education. 
A Brief History: The Role of States in Higher Education 
 While the American federal government has played a supporting role in postsecondary 
education, mostly in terms of financial assistance and research (Mumper, Gladieux, King, & 
Corrigan, 2016), state governments have held primary responsibility for public higher education 
sanctioned by the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Since American colonial colleges 
were established, the role of states in higher education has been dynamic and consequential. Both 
state-level financial support, and control and oversight of public postsecondary institutions, have 
fluctuated as states have responded to changing societal and economic demands.  
During the eighteenth century, states supported private and public institutions via public 
land grants, lottery authorizations, and funds derived from general tax revenues (Heller, 2004). 
However, in the nineteenth century, shortly after the 1819 landmark case of Dartmouth College 
in which the state of New Hampshire failed to gain control of the state-chartered school, states 
largely stopped funding private schools and concentrated appropriations on public institutions 
(Heller, 2004). With the increase of state subsidies to public universities came new demands for 
state oversight and control of these institutions. Expansion of state-level governance entities 
continued as state universities and normal schools multiplied with the enactment of the 1862 
Morrill Land Grant Act (Heller, 2004).  
In the first half of the twentieth century, higher education witnessed a climactic shift from  
a private good purchased mainly by elites to an essential societal investment, as student veterans 
flooded college campuses and the nation responded to the space race with the Soviet Union’s 
launching of Sputnik. As economic and public demands for higher education grew so did the role 
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of states in postsecondary education. New statewide coordinating boards were essential to 
creating higher education capacity through creation of master plans and funding strategies to 
provide resources across institutions (McGuinness, 2016a). The trend during the 1950s into the 
1970s reflected centralized and consolidated governance structures driven by demand for public 
accountability as student enrollments expanded (McLendon & Ness, 2003). However, that trend 
disappeared in 1980s and 1990s, as some states granted greater institutional autonomy through 
decentralization while other states claimed more control in order to increase efficiencies and 
reduce costs (McLendon & Ness, 2003). State financial support of higher education during this 
time was marked by declining appropriations, which generally has continued across the nation 
today. 
Nearly two decades into the 21st century, the role of states in higher education remains 
influx as states face a myriad of ongoing environmental pressures from limited state budgets to 
public demands for higher education affordability and accountability. Some states still seek 
postsecondary governance reform as a way to address these pressures. Lyall (2013) has 
suggested the role of states in higher education will likely remain subject to change and reform 
given the dynamic environment. Thus, whether by drift or by design, the role of states in 
postsecondary education will continue to fluctuate during the twenty-first century (Viggiani & 
Szczerbacki, 2015).   
State Actors and Their Influence on Postsecondary Education 
 The relationship between state governments and higher education is complex and 
essential. From governors, to legislatures, to State Higher Education Executive Officers 
(SHEEOs), a multitude of state actors influence higher education. In many states governors 
wield significant power in allocating state funds and shaping tax policy, both of which may 
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impact higher education (Lingenfelter, Novak, & Legon, 2008). In addition, most governors have 
authority to appoint members of statewide governance boards while some governors also have 
authority to appoint members of institutional boards. Similar to governors, state legislatures are 
major actors in higher education. They shape policy for postsecondary education in various 
ways, such as “creating a demand for improvement, setting the terms of accountability, and 
deciding how much money is provided and where it may be spent” (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 
9). Hendrickson, Lane, Harris, and Dorman (2013) have contended the most influential 
legislators are often members who sit on higher education and budget committees. Largely 
advisors to governors and legislatures, the duties of SHEEOs vary across states. However, 
SHEEOs, like state-level postsecondary governance entities, serve as key links between state 
governments and higher education. Thus, they may often find themselves navigating between 
public policy and politics to be effective (Wellman, 2006).  
State-Level Governance Structures and Their Influence on Higher Education 
 Although no two states are exactly alike in their approach to postsecondary governance, 
all states have at least one entity responsible for the governance of public universities and 
colleges (Fulton, 2019b; McGuinness, 2016b). Generally, states employ two types of centralized 
governance structures: coordinating boards and governing boards (Hendrickson et al., 2013). 
While statewide coordinating boards are often built to facilitate collaboration across institutions, 
statewide governing boards maintain operational authority over the higher education system. 
Consequently, statewide governing boards generally exhibit greater control over public 
postsecondary institutions than coordinating boards. Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have argued the 
strength of coordinating boards lie in their “ability to focus on broad policy issues and to devote 
considerable attention to the data and information required to advise the elected leaders 
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responsible for making policy and allocating public resources” (p. 8). Likewise, effective 
statewide governing boards are able to simultaneously focus on state priorities and institutional 
aspirations (Lingenfelter et al., 2008). Whether coordinating or governing, most boards “are 
designed to provide a “built-in” connection of business and civic leaders to the higher education 
public policy dialogue, and to provide a permanent forum for higher education policy that is 
partially insulated from the give and take and discontinuities of the partisan political process” 
(Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 6).   
Theoretical Framework 
Grounded in evolutionary biology, punctuated equilibrium theory provides a framework 
to understand the public policymaking process during times of stasis and change (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 1993, 2009). Punctuated equilibrium theory contends the policymaking process is 
defined by long periods of stability and incremental policy change. Occasionally, the process is 
marked by major policy change as policy images are redefined and policy issues shift from 
monopolistic policy venues, or policy subsystems, into the larger macropolitical arena. During 
periods of equilibrium, policymaking takes place away from the public eye within individual 
subsystems comprised of bureaucratic experts and interest groups. In times of dramatic policy 
change, however, policymaking moves beyond policy subsystems and often occurs under 
heightened public and media attention.  
McLendon (2003b) has suggested punctuated equilibrium theory is a relevant policy 
framework to study state-level higher education governance reform. He has recommended 
researchers focus on four interdependent concepts: 
(1) the functioning of policy subsystems of issue specialists which routinely make higher 
education governance policy; (2) the ways in which policy images create and sustain 
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monopolistic control over governance issues by a particular subsystem; (3) policy 
entrepreneurs' strategic use of issue-redefinition to mobilize previously disinterested 
parties, thus expanding conflict to new policy venues; and (4) the "punctuation" which is 
theorized to occur when shifting images and venues permit macropolitical institutions to 
intervene into governance policymaking. (p. 122) 
According to McLendon (2003b), a punctuated equilibrium approach to the study of higher 
education governance reform should reveal policymaking marked by periods of stability and 
change. My research study primarily sought to explain elements of stability in state legislative 
policymaking related to higher education governance reform in Nevada, thus acknowledging 
McLendon’s first two concepts. The third and fourth concepts were relevant as well since the 
study compared similarities and differences between the ongoing policymaking process of 
Assembly Joint Resolution 5, and the historical policymaking processes of two higher education 
governance reform initiatives (i.e., Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331) that 
were not passed. Thus, punctuated equilibrium theory provided a sound theoretical framework to 
advance an understanding of Nevada’s state-level policymaking associated with higher education 
governance reform legislation. 
Research Design 
Creswell and Poth (2018) have suggested qualitative research can be used to help explain 
the linkages in causal theories or models. Theories, they contend, “provide a general picture of 
trends, associations, and relationships, but they do not tell us about the processes that people 
experience, why they respond as they did, the context in which they responded, and their deeper 
thoughts and behaviors that governed their responses” (p. 46). This qualitative case study sought 
to explore the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors responded as they did 
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and the context in which they responded. Specifically, the study’s purpose was to understand the 
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework 
of punctuated equilibrium theory.  
Case study research involves in-depth data collection and analysis within a bounded 
system (Creswell & Poth, 2018). My case study was bound within the confines of a single state, 
Nevada, and between years 2000 to 2020, which widened the participant pool and enabled an 
embedded analysis limited to three higher education governance reform bills unique in purpose 
and design (i.e., AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5). Yin (2018) has contended an embedded case 
study can help maintain a case study’s focus. Data collection included legislative documents, 
audiovisual materials, media articles, and interviews. Informed by the document review, I used 
purposeful sampling to recruit, via email, an initial group of policy actors and stakeholders to 
interview, such as current and former legislators and higher education officials, associated with 
AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5. Then I employed snowball sampling to identify additional 
participants. I interviewed 12 individuals over a two-month period, and each interview generally 
lasted between 30 to 35 minutes. Data analysis entailed a priori deductive codes and inductive 
codes based on emergent themes in the data. I also used techniques of pattern matching (Yin, 
2018) and constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to analyze the data. Ultimately, 
multiple data sources from a review of documents and interviews with policy actors and 
stakeholders served to triangulate findings and neutralize bias inherent in any one data source 
(Anfara, Brown, & Mangione, 2002). 
Definitions 
Listed below are terms and their definitions, which aid in understanding this study:  
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Coordinating boards – state-level boards who have power to coordinate actions across a 
higher education system. This power varies by state. Generally, “coordinating boards do not have 
the authority to govern institutions…they do not have powers to grant degrees, establish 
institutional policies, appoint institutional presidents/chancellors, and carry out other functions of 
governing boards” (McGuinness, 2016a, p. 48). 
Governance reform - “changes in structural and authority arrangement by state 
government” (McLendon, 2003b, p. 58).  
Governing boards – boards that “have legal management and control responsibilities for 
a single institution or for a cluster of institutions called a multicampus or university system” 
(Novak, 1996, p. 17)  
Issue expanders - individuals who seek to dismantle policy monopolies by redefining 
policy images in order to shift assignment of policy issues from one venue to another and expand 
the conflict into the macropolitical arena (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). 
Higher education governance - “the combination of governmental and institutional 
structures responsible for postsecondary education in a state” (Wellman, 2006, p. 51). 
Policy images - how policies are understood and discussed (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). 
Policy entrepreneurs - advocates of policy change (Mintrom & Norman, 2009).  
Policy venues - institutions or groups in society who have authority to make decisions 
about policy issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). 
Political entrepreneurs - influential members of government who advocate policy change 
(Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, 2018). 




While a few policy scholars have argued against single-state case studies for their lack of 
generalizability, others have contended it is “soundness of theory and rigor of analysis, rather 
than the number of states, that makes research valid and important” (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 
2002, p. 411). Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002) have also noted scholars of state policymaking 
“should be interested in not only what happens across states, but also what happens within them” 
(pp. 412-413). Ultimately, the application of policy theory to a single state like Nevada 
facilitated a more complex, contextual understanding of the state’s legislative policymaking 
process and provided support for the theoretical concepts of Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (1993, 
2009) punctuated equilibrium theory. 
Significance of the Study 
Since McLendon (2003b) first reported a dearth of scholarship focusing on state-level 
policymaking processes to reform higher education governance, few studies have sought to 
address this gap (McLendon, 2003a; Mills, 2007; Tandberg & Anderson, 2012). These studies 
similarly examined state-level policymaking that resulted in policy change (i.e., adoption of 
higher education governance reform legislation). Like these three studies, this study sought to 
contribute to McLendon’s call for research on state-level policymaking processes to reform 
postsecondary governance. In contrast to these studies however, this study examined state-level 
policymaking processes to reform higher education governance during periods of policy stasis, 
rather than periods of policy change, by investigating the preservation of Nevada’s higher 
education governance entity through the policy lens of punctuated equilibrium theory. Thus, this 
research may offer useful information to state actors (e.g., governors, legislators, state agency 
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officers, and governance boards) who either seek postsecondary governance reform or aim to 
preserve the status quo.  
Summary 
Research has suggested Nevada is deficient in meeting its educated workforce needs. 
Policy scholars (NCPPHE, 2005; Richardson, Bracco, Callan, & Finney, 1999) have contended 
state higher education governance entities built for other times and other public purposes may 
crowd out attention to urgent public priorities. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to 
understand the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the 
theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium theory. A study of Nevada’s state-level 
policymaking process as it pertains to higher education governance reform legislation may 
provide useful information to Nevada’s state policymakers as they seek to address their educated 
workforce needs via postsecondary governance reform. While this chapter provided an overview 
of relevant literature and briefly discussed the study purpose, research questions, theoretical 
framework, research design, definitions, limitations, and the significance of the study, the next 
chapter provides an extensive review of the literature and detailed examination of the theoretical 







A review of postsecondary governance literature underscored the enduring role states 
have played in facilitating higher education performance. It also illustrated how state financial 
support and oversight and control of postsecondary education has often fluctuated since the 
establishment of American colonial colleges as states have responded to changing societal and 
economic demands. Governors, legislatures, State Higher Education Executive Officers, and 
state-level governance structures have all shaped public higher education through financial, 
policy and governance means. Ultimately, when it comes to state-level postsecondary 
governance, the literature has suggested there is no one-size-fits-all model. 
Three bodies of literature helped establish a framework for examining how the state of 
Nevada’s legislative policymaking process has facilitated the preservation of its higher education 
governance entity. The first group presented here offers a brief history of the role of states in 
higher education. The second group examines state actors and their influence on postsecondary 
education. Finally, the last body of literature addresses state-level governance structures and their 
influence on higher education. In addition to the three sets of literature, a review of punctuated 
equilibrium theory provides a policy lens from which to view and understand how the state of 
Nevada’s legislative policymaking process has facilitated the preservation of its higher education 
governance entity.      
A Brief History: The Role of States in Higher Education 
Historically, states have had a consequential and dynamic role in higher education, often 
shifting their levels of financial support and oversight and control. In fact, the 10th Amendment 
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to the U.S. Constitution has sanctioned the states’ role by deferring to them primary 
responsibility for the development and maintenance of public education, including day-to-day 
finance and governance of higher education (Hillman et al., 2015; McLendon & Ness, 2003). 
Between 2017 and 2018, states’ financial support for postsecondary education grew by just 
1.6%, appreciably down from a 4.2% increase in the previous year and the lowest annual growth 
in the last five years (Seltzer, 2018). In terms of governance, some states, such as  Nevada, North 
Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia have recently sought legislation aimed at redesigning their 
higher education governance structures (Fulton, 2019a). To be sure, the role of states in higher 
education has fluctuated over the last 200 years. Thus, a brief historical examination of the role 
of states in higher education is warranted. 
In the eighteenth century, states acted as financiers of higher education, initially 
providing public land grants and lottery authorizations, and later direct financial support from 
general tax revenues, to mostly private, church-chartered institutions (Heller, 2004). With the 
advent of public institutions in the nineteenth century, states expanded their financier role to 
include both private and public universities (Heller, 2004). However, shortly after the 1819 
landmark case of Dartmouth College in which the state of New Hampshire failed to gain control 
of the state-chartered school, states ended nearly all appropriations to private institutions and 
concentrated financial support on public universities (Heller, 2004). In return for the direct 
subsidies states provided to public universities, state legislatures began claiming governance 
control over these institutions by reserving the right to appoint trustees (Brubacher & Rudy, 
1968). However, their control was limited since lay governing boards were responsible for 
providing institutional oversight. Zumeta and Kinne (2011) have pointed out, early lay governing 
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boards, which were often comprised of clergy and other community professionals, enabled a 
“neat” balance between public accountability and institutional autonomy.  
It was not until the enactment of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, which resulted in 
the growth of state universities and normal schools, that state legislatures focused their attention 
on the matter of how to govern these institutions (Heller, 2004). During this time frame and into 
the twentieth century, states developed statewide or systemwide governing boards (Heller, 2004). 
McGuinness (2016a) has noted that by the end of the second world war, 18 states had created 
statewide bodies for governing higher education. According to McGuinness (2016a):  
While the issues differed in each state, an underlying theme was a desire to eliminate 
corruption, to modernize – and often centralize – state government and to counter the 
centrifugal forces of local and regional politics. The expressed intent of several of the 
changes was to curb what was perceived as counterproductive lobbying of the state 
legislature for state funding, unnecessary duplication of academic programs and 
activities, and, in some cases, political intrusion and corruption. (p. 6) 
During this era, states continued their role of funding public universities, while governing boards 
remained fairly autonomous (McGuinness, 2016a).  
Post-World War II also marked the beginning of mass higher education as war veterans 
flooded college campuses with the enactment of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, 
more commonly known as the federal GI Bill (History, n.d.). Nearly 49% of college admissions 
in 1947 were veterans (History, n.d.). Overall, college enrollments increased over 60% from a 
pre-war level of 1.5 million to 2.4 million by 1950 (McGuinness, 2016b). Additionally, the 1958 
National Defense Education Act, passed in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of satellite 
Sputnik and acceleration of the space race, bolstered federal investment in higher education by 
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over a one million dollars over seven years (“National Defense,” n.d.). No longer was higher 
education viewed as a private good purchased mainly by elites, rather it was seen as a societal 
investment essential for supporting the nation’s veterans and “[training] manpower of sufficient 
quality and quantity to meet the national defense needs of the United States” (“National 
Defense,” n.d., para. 1). Consequently, as economic and political demands for higher education 
grew, the role of states in higher education continued to expand as well.    
 From the 1950s into the 1970s, the role of states in higher education shifted from mostly 
offering financial assistance to public institutions to actively building capacity in support of 
opportunity and access (McGuinness, 2016a). With the enactment of the Higher Education Act 
in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated, “Higher education is no longer a luxury, but a 
necessity” (“Higher,” n.d., para. 1). The president also urged universities to help solve national 
problems, such as community development and poverty (“Higher,” n.d.). New statewide 
coordinating boards were essential to creating capacity through the development of master plans, 
new academic programs, and funding methods for the distribution of resources across institutions 
(McGuinness, 2016a). According to McGuinness (2016a), 23 states established statewide 
coordinating boards. Overall, the trend during this era reflected centralized and consolidated 
governance structures, which was driven by a need for public accountability of higher education 
given the tremendous growth of college enrollments (McLendon & Ness, 2003). Some states 
also believed centralized governance could enhance the analytical strength of state-level 
decision-making and result in greater efficiencies across systems (McLendon & Ness, 2003).   
On the contrary, there appeared to be no dominant trend in the role of states in higher 
education governance during the 1980s and 1990s. McLendon (2003b) has found that states 
considered over 100 legislative initiatives to reform their higher education governance systems 
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between 1985 and 2000. Moreover, McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn (2007) have documented 22 
cases of state-level higher education governance reform between 1980 and 2000. While some 
states, such as Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Hawaii, and Oregon lessened their control through 
decentralization and deregulation, other states, such as Alaska, Louisiana, Kansas, Kentucky, and 
South Carolina expanded their oversight and control through centralization (McLendon & Ness, 
2003). The role of states in higher education governance overall reflected “a variegated array of 
state-level reform (sometimes referred to as ‘restructuring’) initiatives representing several 
different patterns of activity, rather than one dominant movement” (McLendon, 2003b, p. 80). 
McLendon and Ness (2003) have highlighted that:  
As in the previous period, “accountability” remained a watchword of reform, but public 
perceptions about how best to achieve accountability shifted during the 1980s and 1990s; 
markets, rather than governments, became viewed as offering the surest mechanism for 
achieving important state policy goals and for improving institutional quality, 
effectiveness, and efficiency. (pp. 68-67) 
Consequently, some states granted more autonomy to public institutions. However, other states 
claimed greater control in an effort to enhance coordination, lower costs, or improve services 
(McLendon & Ness, 2003). For example, McGuinness (1994) has indicated that from 1985 to 
1989, Arkansas, Colorado, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington 
strengthened their coordinating boards by providing more regulatory, master planning, or policy 
leadership powers. 
  The trend of state financial support of public higher education during the 1980s and 
1990s was one of decline (Thelin, 2011). In the 1990s, academic administrators often lamented, 
“Once we were state supported. Then we were state assisted. Now we are state located” (Thelin, 
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2004, p. 36). While some states, such as Virginia, funded their postsecondary institutions based 
on funding received in the previous year, a few states implemented funding formulas based on 
enrollment, costs, or a mix of the two (Hauptman, 2011). Despite the funding approach they 
used, states had charted a path of declining appropriations for public higher education that would 
continue well into the twenty-first century.  
Today, nearly two decades into the twenty-first century, the role of states in higher 
education remains in flux (see Appendix A for a summary of postsecondary reform). States face 
a myriad of environmental pressures, such as limited state budgets and increased public demands 
for higher education affordability and accountability. Research has suggested that America is 
“losing ground in postsecondary education relative to our competitors...increasing our supply of 
skilled labor is central to the vitality of the U.S. economy” (Carnevale & Rose, 2014, p. 13). 
Consequently, states are attempting to address this challenge through governance reform and 
policy means. For example, governors in California and Colorado are presently aiming to 
strengthen their statewide coordinating boards (Toppo, 2019). According to the Education 
Commission of the States, 35 governors in their 2019 State of the State Addresses featured their 
plans to meet state economic needs through workforce development (Pompelia & MacDonald, 
2019). In addition, 19 governors have proposed postsecondary financial aid policies to address 
the need for more affordable higher education (Pompelia & MacDonald, 2019). 
Societal demands to increase the number of college graduates, such as the Lumina 
Foundation’s (2014) “Big Goal,” which challenges states to increase the percentage of 
Americans with degrees and certificates to 60% by 2025, have further burdened states and 
impacted their role in higher education. McGuinness (2016b) has suggested concerns about 
restoring economic competitiveness since the Great Recession in 2008-2009, have driven some 
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states to implement long-term public agenda goals. He has highlighted that a 2014 survey 
conducted by the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems found 26 states 
had indicated they had a statewide goal addressing postsecondary attainment of their citizens, 
while 14 states had reported they did not have such a goal, and 10 states had suggested they were 
in the process of establishing such a goal. As of 2019, the Lumina Foundation has reported 42 
states have adopted attainment goals tied to expected workforce needs. In response to demands 
to increase production of graduates, many states have also employed performance-based funding 
methodologies. Hillman and Corral (2017) have reported that over the past decade, 21 states 
have implemented performance-based funding by tying institutional funding to completion rates, 
rather than enrollment numbers. To be sure, the pressures states have faced have shaped their 
role in higher education. As Lyall (2013) has suggested states and their higher education systems 
will likely continue to be subject to the necessity for change given the current environment. 
Thus, whether by drift or by design, the role of states in higher education will remain influx 
during the twenty-first century (Viggiani & Szczerbacki, 2015).  
What follows in the next two sections of this chapter is an examination of state actors and 
their influence on postsecondary education, along with a review of state governance structures to 
include both coordinating and governing boards. In addition, a brief mention of institutional 
governing boards is warranted since nearly 50% of all states do not have a single statewide 
postsecondary governance entity, rather they employ a combination of system and institutional 
boards to oversee higher education (Cooper & Rosser, 2018). Where appropriate, the state of 
Nevada and its single statewide governance entity are offered as examples to enable comparisons 
across states. Ultimately, an analysis of state actors and state higher education governance 
entities suggests there is no one-size-fits-all model when it comes to postsecondary governance. 
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State Actors and Their Influence on Postsecondary Education 
Any study of policymaking as it pertains to higher education governance reform requires 
an understanding of postsecondary governance and an examination of the complex relationship 
between state actors and higher education. In this study, higher education governance is defined 
as “the combination of governmental and institutional structures responsible for postsecondary 
education in a state” (Wellman, 2006, p. 51). Although the concept of shared governance is often 
included in higher education governance discussions, it is not part of this analysis since emphasis 
here is placed on state-level governance, rather than academic governance (see Mortimer & 
Sathre, 2007 for information on academic governance). According to Wellman (2006), higher 
education governance includes four main functions: “strategic planning and articulation of goals; 
financing; public communication and accountability to different stakeholders; and selection and 
performance review of management” (p. 51). Similar to McGuinness’ (2016a) outline of state 
functions in higher education, Wellman (2006) has identified several mechanisms used in the 
governance of higher education: “policy development, performance review, regulation, and 
finance,” and she has suggested “finance” is the most influential governance mechanism (p. 51).  
Scholars of higher education governance have contended “states invest in higher 
education institutions…under the premise that such institutions will support the public policy 
goals of the state” (Hendrickson et al., 2013, p. 113). They have further indicated academic 
institutions must respond to the way state governments regulate and fund higher education 
because state governments are crucial actors in changing economic environments (Hendrickson 
et al., 2013). “The most successful public university leaders [and academic institutions],” they 
have argued, “are often those who have built long-term relationships with government 
officials…” (Hendrickson et al., 2013, p. 257). To be sure, the relationship between state 
 20 
governments and higher education is complex and essential. From governors, to legislatures, to 
State Higher Education Executive Officers, multiple state actors influence governance of higher 
education and share responsibility for higher education outcomes. 
Governors   
As heads of the executive branch of state government, governors can play an influential 
role in the governance, policymaking, and finance of higher education (Hendrickson et al., 2013; 
Hillman et al., 2015). When governors make higher education a top priority, they often advocate 
for legislation and governance reform (Hendrickson et al., 2013). For instance, researchers have 
found the governor of Massachusetts was the entrepreneur, or champion, in the state’s 1991 
restructure of higher education governance (Tandberg & Anderson, 2012). Lingenfelter et al. 
(2008) have asserted, “Governors have unmatched power to set an agenda for higher education 
and to mobilize other political and civic leaders in pursuit of that agenda” (p. 8). They have 
underscored that in many states, governors wield the most influence in allocating state funds and 
in shaping tax policy, both of which may impact higher education. Besides approving state 
appropriations for higher education, most governors have power to appoint some, if not all, 
members of statewide governance boards, and some have authority to appoint members of 
institutional governance boards (Cooper & Rosser, 2018). A few governors, such as the governor 
of Montana, hold ex officio membership on state boards (“Montana,” n.d.). However, scholars 
have suggested the authority of governors “to influence, sign or veto legislation, to set an agenda, 
and to influence the budget” generally outweigh their powers of appointment (Lingenfelter et al., 
2008, p. 10). Several studies have reported the critical role of governors in state financing of 
higher education (Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Tandberg & Ness, 2011) and in higher education 
governance reform (McLendon, 2003b; McLendon et al., 2007).  
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Despite the similarities in the role of governors across the 50 states, their individual 
powers vary (Hendrickson et al., 2013; Hillman et al., 2015). Fowler (2000, p. 147) has pointed 
out, “The strongest governors are elected to serve a four-year term and can be reelected at least 
once, have the power to appoint numerous state officials, have considerable control over the state 
budget and can veto legislation” (as cited in Hendrickson et al., 2013, p. 116). Beyle (2004) has 
suggested governors possess two types of power: personal power and institutional power (as 
cited in Hillman et al., 2015). Personal power, he has contended, is based on factors such as, 
political ambition (i.e., path to office) and job performance as measured by public opinion (as 
cited in Hillman et al., 2015). Similar to positional power (Northouse, 2013), Beyle (2004) has 
argued institutional power includes factors often set by law, such as appointment authority, term 
length, veto power, and the degree to which a governor’s party controls the legislature (as cited 
in Hillman et al., 2015). While governors hold significant power, they are constrained by 
constitutions, state economic conditions, the willingness of the people to follow and re-elect 
them, length of office, and the political process (Lingenfelter et al., 2008). Likewise, legislatures 
experience similar constraints.  
Legislatures 
Across the nation, state legislatures are key policy actors in higher education. According 
to Lingenfelter et al. (2008), “They shape public policy for higher education in many ways, 
including creating a demand for improvement, setting the terms of accountability, and deciding 
how much money is provided and where it may be spent” (p. 9). From policies created to address 
student financial aid and scholarships to transfer procedures and rules designed to ease the 
transition of student veterans, state legislatures shape higher education in ways that often affect 
students. Sometimes, they pass legislation that directly impacts the operations of universities and 
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colleges, such as when they impose performance-based funding models and reorganize 
governance bodies. Hendrickson et al. (2013) have articulated state legislatures’ “primary 
entanglement usually occurs over state funding of higher education” (p. 114), and thus, “the most 
influential [legislators] tend to be members of budget and higher education committees” (p. 115). 
Although state legislatures share similar roles, they differ in their attributes. A few states 
(i.e., 10 total), such as California and New York, have full-time legislatures, while most states, 
like Nevada and Arizona, have part-time legislatures (Ballotpedia, n.d.). In Nevada specifically, 
the legislature meets biennially for 120 days. Generally, full-time legislatures meet throughout 
the year, have larger staffs, and earn higher salaries than part-time legislatures (Ballotpedia, 
n.d.). A 2014 National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) survey of all state legislators 
found full-time legislators spent 84% of a full-time job equivalent on legislative work and 
received an estimated average annual compensation of $82,000, whereas part-time legislators 
spent between 57% and 74% of a full-time job equivalent on legislative work and received an 
estimated annual compensation between $18,000 and $41,000 (NCSL, n.d.a). Theoretically, full-
time legislators are likely more engaged in shaping their states’ higher education system. 
However, Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have suggested, “legislators [like governors] are constrained 
by the breadth of their responsibilities” and consequently, they cannot “sustain deep involvement 
in any single area, and it is very difficult for them to concentrate their powers on a single issue” 
(p. 9). Thus, whether full- or part-time, legislators may expend appreciable legislative time and 
resources addressing non-higher education issues, such as those related to economic and social 
programs. 
Scholars have indicated partisanship (e.g., party control and party representation) is 
another dimension from which to view state legislatures (Hillman et al., 2015). When a political 
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party holds the majority in both chambers, that party has legislative control (NSCL, n.d.b). When 
a party holds both chambers and the governorship, as the Democratic Party currently does in 
Nevada, that party has state control (NCSL, n.d.b). As of 2019, the Republican Party has 
legislative control in 30 states and state control in 22 states, while the Democratic Party has 
legislative control in 18 states and state control in 14 states (“State and Legislative,” 2019). In 
one state (Minnesota), legislative control is divided since neither party holds both chambers; 
similarly, state control is divided in 13 states (“State and Legislative,” 2019). Nebraska is unique 
in its unicameral status and members are elected on a nonpartisan bases (“State and Legislative,” 
2019). Tandberg (2013) has observed that several studies have found democratic governors [and 
legislatures] to be more generous in financing higher education (Archibald & Feldman, 2006; 
McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a, 2010b).  
State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEOs)  
All states have a minimum of one central administrative entity led by SHEEOs (Hillman 
et al., 2015). Generally, SHEEOs are responsible to help ensure accountability in public higher 
education and are obligated to the postsecondary institutions in their states (Hillman et al., 2015). 
Glenny (1959), an early education scholar who held a statewide perspective on higher education 
(Lingenfelter, 2012), has purported SHEEOs act as secretaries, staff directors, and chief initiators 
of policy recommendations (as cited in Hillman et al., 2015). More recently, Lingenfelter et al. 
(2008) have indicated the duties of SHEEOs largely include:  
(a) advising governors and legislators on higher education policy; (b) making 
recommendations to the state with respect to the allocation of resources; (c) overseeing 
regulatory systems designed to promote quality in the academic offerings of constituent 
campuses; (d) administering state grant programs to students or institutions; and (e) 
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collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and sharing data and information. (as cited in 
Tandberg, Fowles, & McLendon, 2017, p. 112) 
Tandberg et al. (2017) have highlighted that SHEEOs’ responsibilities and how they are 
appointed varies across states. For example, in Nevada, elected regents of the single statewide 
governing board hire and fire the system chancellor who also serves as the SHEEO (“NSHE 
Overview,” n.d.). In Colorado, the governor appoints and fires the SHEEO (“Colorado,” n.d.). 
Tandberg et al. (2017) have suggested “the formal institutional arrangements that tie the SHEEO 
to the governor (in this case, gubernatorial appointment and dismissal powers) may matter more 
than the formal authority granted to the SHEEO (in this case, the SHEEO’s budgetary 
recommendation powers)” (p. 126). Based on an analysis of state-level panel data which entailed 
“1,225 observations, done in 49 states, each of which [was] observed annually from 1985 to 
2009” (p. 117), Tandberg et al. (2017) found that “when [governors appoint SHEEOs], increased 
spending appears to result, all things equal; but when [governors are] able to dismiss [SHEEOs], 
decreased spending appears to result, again, all things equal” (p. 124). Tandberg and his 
colleagues have suggested their results imply SHEEOs are institutional actors in the higher 
education budgetary process, but the potential role they play may be partially set by the 
institutional relationship between SHEEOs and governors. To be sure, SHEEOs like state-level 
governance structures, reside at the intersection between state governments and higher education, 
and therefore, they may often find themselves maneuvering between public policy and politics to 
be effective (Wellman, 2006). 
State-Level Governance Structures and Their Influence on Higher Education 
All states have at least one board that is responsible for the governance of public 
universities and colleges (McGuinness, 2016b). However, most states have multiple boards, and 
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they vary in their level of oversight (i.e., statewide, system, and institutional). For example, in 
Nevada and North Dakota a single statewide board overseas all public postsecondary institutions, 
while in California three separate boards oversee the University of California system, California 
State University and Colleges, and the community colleges (ECS, 2019). Board members, 
commonly known as regents, trustees, or directors, are mostly comprised of university outsiders, 
such as business professionals, lawyers, and doctors (Eckel, 2019). Board membership generally 
ranges from 8 to 17 members. In most states, members are appointed by the governor, however, 
in some states, board members may serve by virtue of their position. Only in Nevada are all 13 
governing regents at the statewide level elected by the public. Hendrickson et al. (2013) have 
contended, “Elected members may wield more political influence and have a greater opportunity 
to challenge unfriendly politicians and institutional leaders” (p. 121) versus board members who 
are appointed. However, analysts, like Richard Novak, former executive director of the Center 
for Public Trusteeship and Governance at the Association of Governing Boards of Universities 
and Colleges, have noted, “Appointed boards tend to have a broader view of the world" and “if 
[governors take] care, [appointed boards] tend to be more effective [than elected boards]” 
(Hebel, 2004, para. 5). Finally, the source of authority for boards can be constitutional or 
statutory. For instance, governance boards in Alaska, Hawaii, and Nevada derive their authority 
from their states’ constitution, while boards in Arkansas and Colorado gain authority via enacted 
laws. Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) have found higher education boards whose source of 
legal authority is derived from statutes are “associated with 8% greater total costs per student, 
14% higher tuition, and 6% lower state appropriations but compliment that with a 58% greater 
allocation of financial aid” (p. 94). 
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Generally, there are two types of centralized state-level higher education governance 
structures: coordinating boards and governing boards (Hendrickson et al., 2013; Novak, 1996; 
Parmley, Bell, L'Orange, & Lingenfelter, 2009). Whether coordinating or governing, most of 
these boards “are designed to provide a “built-in” connection of business and civic leaders to the 
higher education public policy dialogue, and to provide a permanent forum for higher education 
policy that is partially insulated from the give and take and discontinuities of the partisan 
political process” (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 6). According to Hillman et al. (2015), several 
studies have shown postsecondary governance structures can affect state policy behavior, such as 
the types of policies adopted and state financing of higher education (Doyle, 2006; Tandberg, 
2010a, 2013). Moreover, McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006) have argued, “Governance… 
‘matters’ because organizational and authority structures help determine whose interests will 
prevail” (p. 19). Recently, Cooper and Rosser (2018) have found among the 50 states, 20 states 
employed statewide coordinating boards, 8 states had single statewide governing boards, and 22 
states did not have a single statewide postsecondary governance entity rather they employed 
system and institutional boards to govern public higher education (see Appendix B). 
Statewide Coordinating Boards 
 Statewide coordinating boards largely play a role in planning and financing public higher 
education at the state and system level, rather than the institutional level (McGuinness, 2015; 
Parmley et al., 2009). For instance, coordinating boards may develop funding formulas to 
allocate state appropriations, but they do not provide direct input on individual institutional 
budgets (McGuinness, 2016a). According to Hendrickson et al. (2013), coordinating boards are 
“meant to ensure collaboration among the state’s educational institutions and ensure those 
institutions operate in a way that is aligned with state priorities and is in the best interest of the 
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public” (p. 119). Consequently, effective coordinating boards are able to work “in the center of a 
triangle consisting of…the governor, the legislature, and the higher education community” 
(Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 8). Ultimately, the strength of statewide coordinating boards lies in 
their “ability to focus on broad public policy issues and to devote considerable attention to the 
data and information required to advise the elected leaders responsible for making policy and 
allocating public resources” (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 8). However, their limited authority 
may diminish their effectiveness unless they are supported by formal statutes and dynamic 
relationships (Lingenfelter et al., 2008).   
Statewide Governing Boards 
Unlike coordinating boards whose authority is restricted, statewide governing boards 
have operational authority over public postsecondary institutions (Hendrickson et al., 2013). 
Their responsibilities usually entail personnel decisions, institutional operations, and corporate 
governance (Parmley et al., 2009). With a single “chain of command” from statewide governing 
boards to institutional presidents, governing boards hire, evaluate, and can fire university and 
college presidents (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 8). They also maintain fiduciary responsibilities 
and ensure postsecondary institutions execute their missions (Kezar, 2006). Some statewide 
governing boards, like Nevada’s single statewide governing board, have strong executive 
leaders, or chancellors, who play a “significant [role] in developing system strategy, allocating 
resources, and evaluating the performance of institutional chief executives” (Parmley et al., 
2009, p. 2). Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have suggested where no strong executive exists, statewide 
governing boards have emphasized institutional issues over statewide agendas.  
To be effective, governing boards “need the governor’s ear” (Kezar, 2006, p. 992). 
Moreover, they must be able to determine how to best allocate resources across multiple 
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institutions and balance institutional needs (Hendrickson et al., 2013). A fundamental 
responsibility of state governing boards is to oversee the balance between public accountability 
and institutional autonomy (McGuinness, 2016b). This can be challenging. “Boards are often 
criticized for residing in one of two camps – perceived as either too close to the governor or 
appointing authority, or too close to the university administration, and many are unable to 
balance successfully the interests of the public and the state with those of the institution or 
university system” (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 13). Effective statewide governing boards are 
able to focus on state priorities in concert with institutional aspirations (Lingenfelter et al., 2008). 
As of 2018, Nevada and seven other states use statewide governing boards to oversee all 
public postsecondary institutions (Cooper & Rosser, 2018). While governing boards in Alaska, 
Hawai’i, Nevada, and North Dakota are quite similar to each other in their source of authority, 
composition, and number of institutions they oversee, the remaining four statewide governing 
boards in Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Rhode Island have nuances, which make them uniquely 
different (McGuinness, 2016a, pp. 46-47). For example, statewide governing boards in Idaho and 
Rhode Island oversee K-12 and higher education. In Kansas and Montana, the Board of Regents 
govern universities and coordinate community colleges. Regardless of the differences among 
these eight boards, generally speaking, statewide governing boards are associated with greater 
state control and less institutional autonomy. Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have highlighted most 
institutional leaders under statewide governing structures would prefer to have their own 
institutional governing board and the potential autonomy that comes along with it. 
Institutional Governing Boards 
Members of institutional governing boards share similar duties to those of statewide 
governing boards, such as hiring and firing presidents, budgeting, and executing the mission 
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(Mortimer & Sathre, 2007). Additionally, they generally strive to balance institutional aspirations 
with state priorities. Freedman (2004) has asserted that institutional governing boards must 
clearly establish principles to guide institutions’ educational aspirations. Ultimately, the political 
environment in which public universities and colleges exist demands institutional boards and 
presidents nurture strong relationships with governors and legislators since these state actors 
provide policy oversight and institutional funding via state appropriations (Freedman, 2004). 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
Grounded in evolutionary biology, punctuated equilibrium theory provides a framework 
to understand the public policymaking process during times of stasis and change (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 1993, 2009). As Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have acknowledged, the phrase, 
punctuated equilibrium, was coined by paleontologists, Eldredge and Gould (1972), “to describe 
gaps in the evolutionary record” (p. 19). Similarly, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have used 
punctuated equilibrium to describe the policymaking process because it elicits images of stability 
interrupted by large alterations to a system, which they have argued is how policymaking occurs.  
Punctuated equilibrium theory contends the policymaking process is defined by long 
periods of stability and incremental policy change. Occasionally, the process is marked by major 
policy change as policy images are redefined and policy issues shift from monopolistic policy 
venues, or policy subsystems, into the larger macropolitical arena. During periods of equilibrium, 
policymaking takes place away from the public eye within individual subsystems comprised of 
bureaucratic experts and interest groups. In times of dramatic policy change, however, 
policymaking moves beyond policy subsystems and often occurs under heightened public and 
media attention. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have argued the mechanisms of issue definition 
and agenda control and access are essential to understanding fluctuations between periods of 
 30 
stability and change in policymaking. Two core elements of punctuated equilibrium theory—
policy images and policy venues—underscore the role of issue definition and agenda control and 
access in the policymaking process. A closer analysis of these elements and their relationship to 
each other clarifies the public policymaking process from a theoretical lens of punctuated 
equilibrium. In addition, a review of research that has used punctuated equilibrium theory as a 
guiding framework helps inform the current study.   
Policy Images  
 According to Baumgartner and Jones (2009), “how a policy is understood and discussed 
is its policy image” (p. 25). Policy images reflect how policy problems or issues are defined. In 
this study, I use the terms “policy images” and “problem/issue definitions” interchangeably. 
Policy images entail both empirical and affective (e.g., evaluative) components (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009). Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have equated the evaluative component to tone. 
Tone, they have suggested, is vital to issue development “because rapid changes in the tone of 
policy [images] held by social actors (such as the mass media) often presages changes in patterns 
of mobilization” (p. 26). Rochefort and Cobb (1994) have suggested problem definitions, like 
policy images, refer to the way policy issues are presented and discussed, and they serve “to 
explain, to describe, to recommend, and, above all, to persuade” (p.15). Ultimately, Baumgartner 
and Jones (2009) have argued “issue definition…is the driving force in both stability and 
instability, primarily because issue definition has the potential for mobilizing the disinterested” 
(p. 16). Thus, policy actors seek to control issue definitions or policy images as a way to either 
create policy change, or maintain stability in the policymaking process. 
 Problem definitions rarely consist of more than a single dimension of an issue at any 
given time (Rochefurt & Cobb, 1994). To be sure, problem definitions are never value neutral, 
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rather they reflect the beliefs, principles, and political views of the institutions or groups who 
have decision-making authority over the policy issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Rochefurt & 
Cobb, 1994). Rochefurt and Cobb (1994) have noted “the way [problems are] defined invariably 
entails some statement about [their] origins” (p. 15). For example, proposed higher education 
governance reform legislation presented as problems of accountability or economics are likely 
introduced by state authorities while reform legislation characterized as issues of institutional 
autonomy and effectiveness suggests origins of postsecondary institutions and institutional 
trustees. Seidman and Rappaport (1986) have contended, “the definition of a social problem is 
[also] time, place, and context bound” (p. 1). Consequently, policy images may change over time 
as policy actors and decision-makers strategically seek to influence the policymaking process. 
Policy Venues 
 Policy venues are the institutions or groups in society who have authority to make 
decisions about policy issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Thus, venues are mechanisms for 
controlling and accessing policy agendas. Venues may include federal and state agencies, local 
authorities, special interest groups, and various other institutions (McLendon, 2003b). Venues 
that involve governments are known as policy subsystems (McLendon, 2003b). Policy 
subsystems are “characterized by the lack of interference by broader political forces, which defer 
to the judgement of experts” (McLendon, 2003b, p. 108). Mostly comprised of issue specialists 
in government bureaucracies and interest groups, policy subsystems generally work behind 
closed doors away from public view (McLendon, 2003b).  
According to Baumgartner and Jones (2009), policy venues may be monopolistic or 
shared. Thus, one institution may have sole decision-making authority over a policy issue, or 
several groups may share jurisdiction of the issue (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). “History, 
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constitutional arrangements, cultural understandings, and the performance of institutions on 
similar issues in the past all affect the current assignment of issues to institutions” (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 2009, p. 33). Additionally, just as policy images may sometimes shift, so too may 
policy venues  (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). For example, the U.S. constitution has deferred the 
education policy domain to states, although the federal government has been involved at times.  
Generally, in higher education, some policy issue decisions are made by governors, some 
by legislators, some by boards of trustees and State Higher Education Executive Officers, some 
at the institutional level, and occasionally, some by the public. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) 
have suggested “difference in issue assignment create differences in policy, as different groups 
are favored or disadvantaged by different institutional arrangements” (p. 32). Moreover, various 
policy venues may have contrasting and opposing policy images of the same issue (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 2009). For example, state legislators may view increasing tuition rates as an issue of 
student affordability and access to higher education while postsecondary administrators may see 
tuition hikes as a source of revenue needed to offset declining state appropriations. As the saying 
goes, how one sees an issue is often determined by where one sits. To be sure, policy venues 
combined with policy images may significantly impact the policymaking process during periods 
of policy stability and change.  
Relationship Between Policy Images and Policy Venues 
In times of stasis, policy change is usually incremental. Stability is reinforced through 
noninterfering policy monopolies and dominant supporting policy images (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009). McLendon (2003b) has suggested policy actors across all venues have an interest 
in creating and sustaining monopolies. Policy monopolies share two features: “a definable 
institutional structure is responsible for policymaking and that structure can limit access to the 
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policy process [and] a powerful supporting idea is associated with the institution” (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 2009, p. 7).  
Policy subsystems are ideal for facilitating the creation of policy monopolies. Within the 
institutional boundaries of policy subsystems, policymaking remains relatively stable because 
participating bureaucratic issue specialists often share similar values across issues (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 2009). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) likens such values to policy core 
beliefs, which represent both normative and empirical beliefs across a policy domain. Policy 
subsystem actors are also naturally conservative in changing rules of decision-making because 
they understand adjusting rules and procedures may disrupt the status quo and result in 
unintended consequences (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Likewise, they control access to the 
policy agenda by limiting policy issues to a single dimension in which they are the experts 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Consequently, policymaking stays within the confines of policy 
subsystems and stability is maintained over long periods of time. However, subsystems are not 
fully protected from change; policy monopolies can be broken up (McLendon, 2003b). 
Riker (1982) has suggested policy actors may destabilize the policymaking process by 
presenting new dimensions of policy images, thus expanding policy issues beyond current policy 
venues or subsystems (as cited in Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 14). In other words, “if people 
outside the policy subsystem can be convinced that the policy in question has impacts beyond the 
existing set of participants, they can be brought into the conflict” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, 
p. 19). According to Redford (1969), when political policy actors, such as the U.S. president and 
congressional committee leaders, are brought into the process, the level of policy attention is 
referred to as “macropolitics” to set it apart from “subsystem politics” or individual political 
behavior (as cited in Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 21). Similarly, when governors and 
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legislative committee members are brought into the higher education policymaking process, the 
level of attention expands beyond the institutional or trustee subsystem levels into the larger 
macropolitical arena. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have contended that the strategic movement 
of policy issues into larger macropolitical policy arenas “is simply an extension of the process of 
creation, destruction, and failure of policy monopolies” (p. 21).  
Issue expanders often seek to dismantle policy monopolies by redefining policy images 
in order to shift assignment of policy issues from one venue to another and expand the conflict 
into the macropolitical arena (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Similarly, Kingdon (1984, 2003) has 
suggested policy entrepreneurs or advocates, “hook solutions to problems, proposals to political 
momentum, and political events to policy problems” (p. 180) in order to promote their policy 
positions and limit or expand access to the policy agenda. The media may also influence policy 
agenda access. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have suggested when there is elevated media 
attention on a specific issue, there is often some level of policy change. To be sure, “policy 
consequences of agenda access can be dramatic” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 20). Together, 
policy images and policy venues, facilitate policy shifts between stability and change and thus, 
serve to explain punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).   
Previous Research Using Punctuated Equilibrium Theory    
As McLendon (2003b) has highlighted, Kelly (1994) observed other researchers had 
previously applied a punctuated change model to study American political institutions (see 
Burnham, 1970; Clubb, Flanagan, & Zingale, 1980; Huntington, 1981; Mayhew, 1991; and 
Sundquist, 1983). However, Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2009) have pointed out their research 
unified the macropolitical arena-policy subsystem dynamic (Redford, 1969) with studies of 
agenda setting and conflict expansion (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Kingdon, 1984; Schattschneider, 
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1960) to explain both stability and change in public policymaking. Specifically, their study 
traced the paths of seven U.S. policy issues over an extended period of time—nuclear power, 
pesticides, drug and alcohol abuse, smoking and tobacco, automobile safety, urban policy, and 
child abuse—to explain elements of stability and causes of change in policymaking.  
Since Baumgartner’s and Jones’ initial work, numerous international policy researchers 
have applied punctuated equilibrium theory to their own countries, extending the theory’s 
applicability beyond American public policymaking (Baumgartner, Jones, & Mortenson, 2018). 
Additionally, Baumgartner et al. (2018) have reported that within the U.S., both qualitative and 
quantitative studies have used punctuated equilibrium theory to examine environmental policy 
(Busenberg, 2004; Repetto, 2006; Salka, 2004; Wood, 2006), firearms control (True & Utter, 
2002), regulatory drug review (Ceccoli, 2003), regulation of state hospital rates (McDonough, 
1998), and education (Manna, 2006; McLendon, 2003c; Mulholland & Shakespeare, 2005; 
Robinson, 2004). Moreover, they have contended these studies provide strong evidence that 
punctuated equilibrium appears to be a key aspect of U.S. policymaking.  
McLendon (2003b) has suggested punctuated equilibrium theory is a relevant policy 
framework to study higher education governance reform. He has recommended researchers focus 
on four interdependent concepts: 
(1) the functioning of policy subsystems of issue specialists which routinely make higher 
education governance policy; (2) the ways in which policy images create and sustain 
monopolistic control over governance issues by a particular subsystem; (3) policy 
entrepreneurs' strategic use of issue-redefinition to mobilize previously disinterested 
parties, thus expanding conflict to new policy venues; and (4) the "punctuation" which is 
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theorized to occur when shifting images and venues permit macropolitical institutions to 
intervene into governance policymaking. (p. 122) 
According to McLendon (2003b), a punctuated equilibrium approach to the study of higher 
education governance reform should reveal policymaking marked by periods of stability and 
change. Despite McLendon’s endorsement, peer-reviewed research that integrates state-level 
higher education governance reform with punctuated equilibrium theory remains rather limited 
(McLendon, 2003c; Mills, 2007; Tandberg & Anderson, 2012; Van Der Slik, 2001). Thus, the 
current study aimed to fill that gap. Specifically, this study primarily sought to explain elements 
of stability in state legislative policymaking as it related to higher education governance reform 
in Nevada, thus acknowledging McLendon’s first two concepts. The third and fourth concepts 
were relevant as well since the study compared similarities and differences between the ongoing 
policymaking process of Assembly Joint Resolution 5, and the historical policymaking processes 
of higher education governance reform initiatives that were not passed (i.e., Assembly Joint 
Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331). Thus, punctuated equilibrium theory provided a sound 
theoretical framework for the current study. 
Summary 
Historically, states have had a dynamic role in higher education. Today, nearly two 
decades into the twenty-first century, the role of states in postsecondary education has remained 
in flux as state actors respond to increasing economic and public demands for higher education 
accountability and affordability. While states have often used policy and financial levers to 
advance societal goals and priorities, they have also opted to reform their state-level 
postsecondary governance entity. This qualitative case study sought to understand the 
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework 
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of punctuated equilibrium theory. Punctuated equilibrium theory has been well-suited to examine 
state-level higher education governance reform because it can address both stability and change 









As noted in Chapter 2, a review of the literature has suggested a gap exists in 
understanding state-level legislative policymaking associated with higher education governance 
reform. In addition, some scholars have called for an expansion of policy-relevant higher 
education research (Hillman et al., 2015; McLendon, 2003c). Thus, this study has sought to 
address these deficiencies. Specifically, the purpose of this qualitative case study was to 
understand the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the 
theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium theory. The primary research question guiding 
this study was: How has the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process facilitated the 
preservation of the statewide higher education governance entity? A secondary question asked: 
How is the legislative policymaking process of the ongoing higher education governance reform 
bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or different from the process that addressed 
Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331, two former higher education governance 
reform bills that were not passed?  
This chapter is comprised of seven sections. In the first section I provide an overview of 
the study’s research design. Then, I describe the case site to include a brief history of Nevada’s 
higher education and postsecondary governance reform legislation. In the third section, I define 
the case selection criteria, followed by a description of the data collection procedures. Next, I 
address data analysis. In the final two sections, I explain my approach to establishing a 




Creswell and Poth (2018) have suggested qualitative research can be used to help explain 
the linkages in causal theories or models. Theories, they contend, “provide a general picture of 
trends, associations, and relationships, but they do not tell us about the processes that people 
experience, why they respond as they did, the context in which they responded, and their deeper 
thoughts and behaviors that governed their responses” (p. 46). This qualitative case study sought 
to explore the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors responded as they did 
and the context in which they responded. Specifically, the study’s purpose was to understand the 
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework 
of punctuated equilibrium theory.  
Case Study  
Case study design is appropriate since this study focused on a contemporary phenomenon 
of interest within its real-life context (Yin, 2018). Case study is also well-suited for research 
questions that ask “how” and “why” about a phenomenon of interest (Yin, 2018). The primary 
research question guiding this study was: How has the state of Nevada’s legislative 
policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education governance 
entity? A secondary question asked: How is the legislative policymaking process of the ongoing 
higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or different 
from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331, two 
former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed?  
While a few policy scholars have argued against single-state case studies for their lack of 
generalizability, others have contended it is “soundness of theory and rigor of analysis, rather 
than the number of states, that makes research valid and important” (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 
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2002, p. 411). Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002) have also noted scholars of state policymaking 
“should be interested in not only what happens across states, but also what happens within them” 
(pp. 412-413). Ultimately, the application of policy theory to a single state like Nevada 
facilitated a more complex, contextual understanding of the state’s legislative policymaking 
process and provided support for the theoretical concepts of Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (1993, 
2009) punctuated equilibrium theory. 
Case Site 
Creswell (2016) has underscored the value of starting with a broad picture of the case site 
and then narrowing it to create a contextual understanding of the case. In this section, I first 
provide a brief history of Nevada’s public higher education system. Next, I outline the state-level 
postsecondary governance entity that exists today. I conclude with a condensed summary of 
Nevada’s historical higher education governance reform legislation.  
Brief History of Public Higher Education in Nevada  
The state of Nevada entered the Union as the 36th state on October 31st, 1864, during the 
civil war, hence the nickname, “Battle Born” (“Nevada State Nicknames,” n.d.). In less than 
three years, Nevada had transitioned from territory to statehood faster than any of its western 
counterparts (McAffee & McAffee, 2014). McAffee and McAffee (2014) have highlighted:  
The adopted state constitution placed almost unique emphasis on, and provided an entire 
article of the constitution governing, the subject of education. Education was bound to be 
a central area of attention, given the enactment of the Morrill Act of 1862, which required 
specific areas of instruction in public universities if states were to qualify for federal 
financial assistance. (p. 833) 
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Specifically, Article 11, Section 4, established “a State University which shall embrace 
departments for Agriculture, Mechanic Arts, and Mining to be controlled by a Board of Regents 
whose duties shall be prescribed by law.”  
In 1874, ten years post-statehood, the University of Nevada (now University of Nevada, 
Reno, UNR) opened in Elko (Greenhaw, 1997). “The “State University,” as Elko residents called 
it, rarely enrolled more than 30 students, a few of whom might have qualified for high school 
admission, if a high school had existed” (Greenhaw, 1997, p. 90). Nevada’s population in 1880 
was just over 62,000 people (“Nevada History,” n.d.). In 1886, the University of Nevada moved 
to Reno (Greenhaw, 1997). Nearly 70 years later in 1957, what is now known as the University 
of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), was first established as the Southern Regional Division of the 
University of Nevada (Damore, Lang, Nasoz, Brown, & Saladino, 2017). The legislature gave 
the southern campus autonomy and a new name in 1965: Nevada Southern University (Damore 
et al., 2017). By 1969, “UNLV,” along with the Desert Research Institute (DRI,) which had also 
originated as a division of the northern university, were granted equal status with UNR by the 
legislature (Damore et al., 2017; “DRI,” n.d.). These three institutions remain today, and in 2018, 
the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education designated both, UNLV and 
UNR, “R1: Doctoral Universities – Very high research activity.” 
 Unlike its rapid transition into statehood, Nevada was one of the last states to establish 
community colleges (Greenhaw, 1997). The first community college (now Great Basin College) 
opened in Elko in 1967 under the 22nd Republican Governor Paul Laxalt (“Nevada History,” 
n.d.). Nevada’s three other community colleges were established in 1971 under Democrat 
Governor Mike O’Callaghan (“Nevada History,” n.d.): College of Southern Nevada, Truckee 
Meadows Community College, and Western Nevada College. (“NSHE Institutions,” n.d.).  
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To help the Board of Regents oversee Nevada’s public higher education universities and 
colleges, the legislature created the University and Community College System of Nevada 
(UCCSN) in 1967 (“The Nevada Registry,” n.d.). UCCSN was renamed the Nevada System of 
Higher Education (NSHE) in 2005, the same year Nevada State College was established (“NSHE 
Institutions,” n.d.). According to legal analysts, Powers (2014) and McAffee and McAffee 
(2014), NSHE acts as a state agency to provide administrative support for the Board of Regents 
(as cited in Martinez, 2014). Today, Nevada’s public higher education system, comprised of two 
research universities, one state college, four community colleges, and DRI, provides educational 
opportunities to over 100,000 students combined (“NSHE News,” 2019).   
Nevada’s Postsecondary Governance Entity   
 
The “Board of Regents of the State University” consists of 13 publicly-elected members 
who have constitutional authority to “govern” the Nevada System of Higher Education (“NSHE 
Overview,” n.d.). This is unlike all other “statewide” governing and coordinating boards whose 
members are mostly appointed by governors or selected based on their official position. Election 
years vary across 13 state districts to ensure overlap and continuity of board members (NRS 
396.040, n.d.). Only when a board vacancy occurs does the governor step in to appoint a 
replacement to serve until the next succeeding general election (NRS 396.060, n.d.). Regents 
serve a six-year term (Bowers, 2013). Like most governing boards, Nevada’s Board of Regents 
are responsible for setting policy, approving budgets, and hiring/firing of the institutions’ 
presidents. The regents also appoint the chancellor, who serves as the chief executive officer 
(CEO) for NSHE and as the SHEEO. As CEO, the chancellor supervises the eight institutional 
presidents and ensures board policies are implemented across the public higher education system 
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(“NSHE Overview,” n.d.). Additionally, the chancellor serves as NSHE’s liaison to the governor, 
state legislators, and other public officials and community leaders (“NSHE Overview,” n.d.).  
Summary of Nevada’s Higher Education Governance Reform Legislation  
 Throughout its 156-year history, the state of Nevada has maintained its single state-level 
higher education governance system largely intact since its creation in 1864. While the 
legislature has marginally adjusted the number of regents and their term limits, they have not 
enacted legislation that reforms the higher education governance structure or changes its 
authority arrangement. Consequently, Nevada’s single state-level postsecondary governance 
structure exists today as it did in 1864. Periodically, however, public debate and legislative 
proposals have centered on the way members of the Board of Regents are selected and their 
powers and duties (Stonefield, 2003). Past debates have also focused on the role of public higher 
education in Nevada’s overall economic and societal well-being (Stonefield, 2003).  
Since 1957, at least 15 joint resolutions to change the Board of Regents by amending 
Article 11 (Education) of the Nevada Constitution have been introduced in the legislature (see 
Stonefield, 2003, for details about resolutions entered between 1957 to 2000). Most resolutions 
have called for the “appointment” of some regents. Some have proposed a separate board for 
community colleges. Most recently, Assembly Joint Resolution 5 has sought to remove the 
Board of Regents from the constitution, making it a statutory body rather than a constitutional 
entity (see Appendix C for summary of joint resolutions to change Nevada Board of Regents). 
With the exception of Assembly Joint Resolution 5, which is still in progress, all governance 
reform initiatives to amend Nevada’s Education Article 11 have failed. Thus, Nevada’s single 
state-level higher education governance entity, like the hardy Nevada sagebrush, largely exists 
today as it did in 1864.  
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Case Selection Criteria 
Creswell and Poth (2018) have indicated case study research involves detailed, in-depth 
data collection and analysis within a bounded system. My case study was bound within the 
confines of a single state, Nevada, and between the years 2000 to 2020. Yin (2018) has argued 
the single-case study design is justifiable when a case represents an “extreme or unusual 
circumstance” (p. 53). I focused on Nevada because it represented an unusual case in that it has 
not substantially changed its higher education governance entity since it was established in 1864, 
which is unlike many other states who have reformed their governance structures over time. My 
rationale for the twenty-year time span was that it allowed me to address three different higher 
education governance reform bills and widened my access to policy actors and stakeholders who 
were directly involved in the legislative policymaking process in Nevada. For this study, higher 
education governance reform referred to “changes in structural and authority arrangement by 
state government” (McLendon, 2003b, p. 58). According to Yin (2018), an analysis limited to 
three higher education governance reform bills rather than an analysis of all higher education 
governance reform bills in Nevada, classified my research as an “embedded” single-case study 
versus a “holistic” single-case study. Such an approach, Yin (2018) has contended, “can serve as 
an important device for maintaining a case study’s focus” (p. 53). Next, I briefly describe the 
three higher education governance reform bills that center my research study.   
Assembly Joint Resolution (AJR) 11 
AJR 11 was introduced during the 72nd Legislative Session (2003) by former 
Assemblywoman Christina Giunchigliani (Democratic Party). It “[proposed] to amend the 
Nevada Constitution to provide for the election of certain members of the Board of Regents and 
the gubernatorial appointment of certain members of the Board of Regents, and to specify the 
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number and terms of the members” (p. 1). Twice amended, it passed both the Nevada Assembly 
and Senate and returned to the Nevada legislature in 2005 during the 73rd Legislative Session. 
Once again it passed both houses, however, in 2006, by a margin of over 7,300 votes (269,807 in 
favor, 277,174 opposed) Ballot Question No. 9 failed to win voter approval, and AJR 11 died 
(“Nevada Statewide Ballot Questions,” 2006).  
Assembly Bill (AB) 331 
 AB 331, officially titled, “Creates the Nevada System of Community Colleges. (BDR 34-
28),” was proposed during the 79th Legislative Session (2017) by former Assemblyman Ira 
Hansen (Republican Party). Had this bill passed it would have accomplished the following: 
“Effective July 1, 2018, this bill generally transfers authority for the supervision and control of 
community colleges from the Board of Regents to the State Board for Community Colleges and 
the boards of trustees of such community colleges” (p. 2). AB 331 died in the Assembly in 2017. 
AJR 5 
AJR5 was introduced in the 79th Legislative Session (2017) by former Assemblyman 
Elliot Anderson and Senator Joyce Woodhouse (both Democratic Party). AJR 5, or the Nevada 
Higher Education Reform, Accountability and Oversight Amendment, currently proposes to 
“amend the Nevada Constitution to remove the constitutional provisions governing the election 
and duties of the Board of Regents of the State University and to authorize the Legislature to 
provide by statute for the governance, control and management of the State University and for 
the reasonable protection of individual academic freedom” (p. 1). In Nevada, a constitutional 
change is a five-year process; the legislature must approve the change in two consecutive 
biennial sessions and then the public must approve it via a ballot measure. Consequently, AJR 5 
is still under consideration. The legislature passed AJR 5 in 79th (2017) and 80th (2019) 
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Legislative Sessions. The public will have final say on the amendment when they vote on it as a 
ballot question in November 2020.  
Data Collection Procedures  
Case study methodology relies on extensive and multiple sources of data, such as public 
documents, private letters, archival records, audiovisual materials, direct observations, physical 
artifacts, and interviews (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Yin, 2018). My data collection included public 
documents, archival records, audiovisual materials, and interviews. Specifically, the first phase 
of data collection entailed a review of over 150 documents, and the second phase encompassed 
12 interviews (i.e., five current and former legislators, five current and former higher education 
officials; and two relevant private citizens).  
Document Review  
During phase one of data collection, I reviewed publicly available documents, such as 
media news articles, legislative bills, legislative reports, legislative committee meeting agendas 
and minutes, and other related material, as they pertained to Nevada bills: AJR 11, AB 331, and 
AJR 5. I also reviewed Nevada Senate and Assembly Committees on Legislative Operations and 
Elections and Committees on Education video recordings from the 79th (2017) and 80th (2019) 
Legislative Sessions. Video recordings for the 72nd (2003) and 73rd (2005) Legislative Sessions 
were unavailable. A thorough review of documents and recordings not only offered relevant 
insight about the legislative policymaking process in Nevada, but it also helped identify primary 
policy actors to interview during the second phase of my data collection. 
Interviews  
Informed by the document review, I used purposeful sampling to recruit, via email, an 
initial group of policy actors and stakeholders to interview, such as current and former legislators 
 47 
and higher education officials associated with AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5 (see Appendix D for 
my recruitment email). Purposeful sampling helped ensure participants who could contribute to 
my understanding of the case (Creswell, 2016; Mills & Gay, 2016). I also employed snowball 
sampling to locate additional participants by asking those interviewed to identify any other 
relevant policy actors and stakeholders (Creswell, 2016). Over a two-month period, I interviewed 
12 individuals of whom two had participated in the policymaking process across all three bills, 
three had engaged across two bills and the remaining seven had participated in one of the bills 
either as a legislator, higher education official, or private citizen. These interviews, combined 
with the document review, allowed me to achieve data saturation or redundancy (Mills & Gay, 
2016). I employed semi-structured interviews. The work of Turner (2010) and Creswell (2016) 
guided my interview protocol design, which focused on understanding the preservation of 
Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the framework of punctuated equilibrium 
theory (see Appendix E for my interview protocol). Once interviews were scheduled, I emailed 
participants copies of the interview protocol and informed consent. Prior to the start of each 
interview, I verbally confirmed consent and receipt of the protocol. In addition, I disclosed my 
graduate assistantship at The Lincy Institute, given the institute’s public support for 
postsecondary governance reform in Nevada. All interviews were conducted by phone with the 
exception of one interview, which was executed face-to-face at the participant’s request. The 
longest interview lasted nearly 46 minutes while the shortest interview was completed just under 
16 minutes. Most interviews ranged between 30 and 35 minutes. With the exception of one 
participant, all interviewees gave consent to audio-record the interviews. Recordings were 
transcribed via an IRB-approved transcription service. For readability, speech particles, such as 
“um” or “ah,” were removed from the transcripts. I took minimal notes during most interviews, 
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primarily jotting down my follow-up questions. After each interview, I emailed participants a 
copy of their transcript to ensure accuracy and gain any additional comments. Five participants 
responded with only minor grammatical edits or additional clarification on their responses. 
Data Analysis  
Analysis of data entailed repeated reading, coding, and memoing of textual material 
collected from both interview transcripts and document reviews. The work of Yin (2018) and 
Saldaña (2016) guided my data analysis and coding process. I started by determining my a priori 
deductive codes based on Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (1993, 2009) punctuated equilibrium theory 
and the literature review (Bradley, Curry, & Devers, 2007). Then, I employed inductive codes 
based on emergent themes in the data. Specifically, I applied descriptive codes during first cycle 
coding. In vivo coding of documents in general, and interview transcripts in particular, provided 
me an emic perspective of the participants (Saldaña, 2016). I also used manifest and latent 
content analysis specifically in my analysis of AJR 5 as a way to make inferences about 
messages conveyed in the data (Berg, 2001).   
During the second cycle of coding, I employed techniques of pattern matching (Yin, 
2018) and constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to analyze the data. Pattern matching 
entails comparing empirically-based patterns from my case study findings to alternative patterns 
predicted before data collection and is one of the most advantageous techniques to use in case 
study analysis (Yin, 2018). Constant comparison “involves taking one piece of data (one 
interview, one statement, one theme) and comparing it with all others that may be similar or 
different in order to develop conceptualizations of the possible relations between various pieces 
of data” (Thorne, 2000, p. 69). Similar to Mills (2007), I analyzed text to illuminate similarities 
and differences in perspectives expressed and to identify policy goals and rationales that led to 
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support for, or against, AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5. I also sought to highlight the policy images 
and policy venues associated with AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5 to understand how images and 
venues influenced the life cycles of these three bills.   
 I used ATLAS.ti software primarily to support the coding process of interview 
transcripts. Specifically, I created memos in Atlas.ti to record my insights and questions as I 
analyzed, synthesized, and integrated the data into themes and findings (Saldaña, 2016). In 
addition, I used the software to help identify salient codes and patterns within and across study 
participants. Dominant codes were arranged into themes to describe patterns across the data. As 
Stake (1995) has suggested, data analysis ultimately resulted in a thorough description of the 
case, themes that emerged from the data, and assertions about the case (as cited in Creswell, 
2016, p. 266). 
Validity and Reliability: Trustworthiness 
Validity and reliability, both measures of research design quality, have historically been 
linked to quantitative research (Mills & Gay, 2016). However, Creswell and Poth (2018) have 
indicated these two concepts are also important criteria for judging the robustness of qualitative 
research. Qualitative scholars have generally reframed these quantitative concepts as 
trustworthiness criteria, which include measures of credibility, transferability, dependability, 
confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Anfara et al. (2002) have indicated credibility and 
transferability are equivalent to internal and external validity, respectively, while dependability 
and confirmability are comparable to reliability and objectivity, respectively (see Anfara et al., 
2002, Table 1, p. 30). For case study research, Yin (2018, p. 43) has articulated four criteria for 
judging research design quality: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and 
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reliability. Given my study was a qualitative case study, I used Yin’s approach to ensure 
robustness.  
Construct Validity 
 Construct validity is the “[identification of] correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied” (Yin, 2018, p. 42). Yin has contended multiple data sources and member checking 
can help ensure construct validity. I collected evidence from a variety of data sources during the 
review of documents and interviews to substantiate my findings. In addition, I shared the 
interview transcripts with participants to confirm accuracy.  
Internal Validity (Credibility) 
 Yin (2018) has defined internal validity as “seeking to establish a causal relationship, 
whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from 
spurious relationships” (p. 42). He has posited that internal validity is a consideration when a 
researcher attempts to explain how and why event x led to event y. During data analysis, I used 
pattern matching to compare empirical and predicted patterns, which “may be related to the 
“how’s” and “why’s” of [my] case study” (Yin, 2018, p. 175). For example, how and why the 
Nevada legislative policymaking process operated as it did, and how and why operations led to 
certain results. Congruence between actual and predicted patterns served to strengthen the 
study’s internal validity (Yin, 2018).  
External Validity (Transferability) 
 External validity entails “showing whether and how a case study’s findings can be 
generalized” (Yin, 2018, p. 42). Yin has suggested a “case study” should be thought of as an 
opportunity to illuminate some theoretical concepts (i.e., analytical generalization) rather than as 
a sample. In other words, analytical generalization from this study were “based on corroborating, 
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modifying, rejecting or otherwise advancing” theoretical elements of punctuated equilibrium 
theory” (Yin, 2018, p. 38).  
Reliability (Dependability) 
 Reliability is about “demonstrating that the operations of a study—such as its data 
collection procedures—can be repeated, with the same results” (Yin, 2018, p. 42). According to 
Yin, the goal of reliability is to reduce errors and biases during study replication. He has 
highlighted three techniques: use a case study protocol, develop a case study database, and 
maintain a chain of evidence, or audit trail, as Guba and Lincoln (1982) have suggested. I 
developed a case study protocol to guide data collection. Moreover, my interview protocol 
ensured a consistent line of questions for all participants. I housed my interview transcripts, 
memos, and research diary within Atlas.ti. Finally, my audit trail included my IRB documents, 
email correspondence, participant list, memos, and research diary. 
Human Subjects and Ethical Considerations 
I obtained informed consent from all voluntary participants verbally and/or via their 
signature on an IRB-approved consent form prior to each interview (see Appendix F for the 
consent form). The form delineated the purpose of the study, participant selection criteria, study 
procedures, and any potential risks of participation, which was minimal. Because interview 
participants included state politicians and public figures, I masked all identifiable characteristics 
by using group-level identifiers to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. I avoided attributing 
direct quotations to interview participants by name. However, I used names and quoted state 
politicians and public figures when the data were publicly available, such as bill sponsorship, 
public documents, and media releases. To ensure interview data remained confidential, I stored 
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recordings and transcripts in a secure location accessible only by me and my dissertation 
committee members.   
Summary 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s 
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium 
theory. The embedded single-case design focused on three unique higher education governance 
reform bills: AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5, in order to examine Nevada’s legislative 
policymaking process primarily during times of stasis. Multiple data sources from a review of 
documents and interviews with policy actors and stakeholders served to triangulate the findings 
and neutralize bias inherent in any one data source (Anfara et al., 2002).  
Next, Chapter 4 addresses the results of this study. It also presents answers to my two 
research questions: (1) How has the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process 
facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education governance entity? (2) How is the 
legislative policymaking process of the ongoing higher education governance reform bill, 
Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or different from the process that addressed 
Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331, two former higher education governance 








 The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s 
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium 
theory. This study explored the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors 
responded as they did and the context in which they responded by examining the life cycle of 
three higher education governance reform bills unique in purpose and design (i.e., AJR 11, AB 
331, and AJR 5). The primary research question that guided this study was: How has the state of 
Nevada’s legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher 
education governance entity? A secondary question asked: How is the legislative policymaking 
process of the ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, 
similar to and/or different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and 
Assembly Bill 331, two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed?  
 Three overarching themes emerged from extensive data analysis: (1) public support of 
AJR 11 was insufficient to overcome a structure-induced equilibrium created by the Nevada 
Constitution; (2) the policy solution AB 331 offered was too extreme and complex to garner 
legislative support; and (3) perchance, unconventional tactics AJR 5 cosponsors used in the 
legislative policymaking process of AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation 
that ultimately reforms Nevada’s higher education governance entity. In this chapter, I address 
embedded cases, AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5, respectively, first setting the scene and describing 
pertinent events associated with each bill, and then presenting each finding. Unless otherwise 
cited, all quotes are from interview participants or from those who offered legislative testimony.  
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AJR 11: Insufficient Public Support to Overcome Structure-Induced Equilibrium 
 AJR 11 proposed “to amend the Nevada Constitution to provide for the election of certain 
members of the Board of Regents and the gubernatorial appointment of certain members of the 
Board of Regents, and to specify the number and terms of members” (p. 1). During the 2003 and 
2005 Legislative Sessions, both the Senate and the Assembly passed AJR 11 by a constitutional 
majority. In 2006, however, voters rejected Ballot Question No. 9 by a narrow 1.4% margin of 
7,367 votes (277,174 votes opposed, 269,807 votes in favor), and AJR 11 died (“Nevada 
Statewide Ballot Questions,” 2006). Discussing AJR 11’s demise, an interviewed legislator 
stated, “People don’t like having their ability to vote on who their representatives are removed.”  
 Data analysis suggested voters likely rejected AJR 11 because they did not want to give 
up their right to vote for regents, or any other elected officials, historically protected by the 
Nevada Constitution. This sentiment was similarly articulated by five interview participants and 
discussed by several legislators during the 2003 and 2005 committee hearings on AJR 11. 
Additionally, absence of both widespread support and a public education campaign in favor of 
AJR 11, and to a lesser extent, media’s push to vote ‘no’ on Ballot Question No. 9, buttressed the 
structure-induced equilibrium provided by the Constitution, and ultimately led to the 
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity. In the next two sections, I first set 
the stage for this embedded case by briefly describing the pertinent events leading up to the 
public’s dismissal of AJR 11. Then, I address the details of the finding. 
Setting the Stage: AJR 11  
 Late afternoon April 3, 2003, during the 72nd Legislative Session, Democrat 
Assemblywoman Chris Giunchigliani introduced AJR 11 to the Assembly Committee on 
Elections, Procedures, and Ethics, a committee she also chaired in 2003. Addressing members, of 
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whom five were Democrats and four were Republicans, she began, “The bill before you is a 
recommendation for appointment of the Board of Regents.” She noted members had in their 
possession background information on regent selection methods all other states used, and she 
highlighted Nevada’s unique election process.  
 You will note that it is a ‘hodgepodge.’ I found no real consistency in any of those 
 formats. They have different government structures throughout. What I did find, 
 though, at least according to staff analysis that had been done, in their opinion, Nevada 
 was one of the only states that still did not have some form of appointment mechanism. 
She continued, “The bill before you was written for full appointment of all seven regents.” 
Unamended, AJR 11 not only gave the governor power to appoint all regents, it also downsized 
the Board of Regents from thirteen to seven members and reduced their term from six to four 
years. AJR 11 was later twice amended to reflect a nine-person blended board, comprised of six 
governor appointed regents and three elected regents from Nevada’s three congressional districts, 
and a term of four years. Bill item five also required “Not more than two-thirds of the appointed 
members of the Board of Regents may be members of the same party” (AJR 11, 2003). 
 Policy problems AJR 11 aimed to mitigate. According to Assemblywoman 
Giunchigliani’s testimony, the policy problems AJR 11 aimed to mitigate were the politicization 
of the Board of Regents and board costs.  
I think we need to empower them [Board of Regents] to be successful and to be policy-
 driven, not micromanaging. You’re always going to have some politicization…but we’re 
 trying to depoliticize the board as much as possible. [ ] I also think it’s a way to save 
 dollars. If you look at the cost of just running that many board meetings for 13 people 
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 now, the last numbers I had were based, I believe, on an 11-member board, and it was 
 around $638,000 a year; that comes out of their funding formula. 
Referring to potential dollars saved, she suggested that money could return to student programs. 
 That actually can go back into programs for students, and I think that ought to be the 
 ultimate goal of everybody, is to make sure that we’re providing the best education for 
 the students and then making sure the working conditions are good for the people that 
 chose to work within the system. That’s really the intent of AJR 11. 
Name-dropping, she indicated Governor Kenny Guinn’s support of the bill. “I’ve spoken with 
the governor. He wants the appointment. He would accept the blended concept as well.” She 
closed stating, “This is a policy decision, and I wanted the decision to be made on that, not on 
emotions or personalities as best we can get away from that.” 
 Antecedent controversy among regents bolstered support for AJR 11. In December 
2002, the Las Vegas Sun reported, “errant behavior” of three regents had convinced the governor 
to support AJR 11. Columnist Jeff German wrote:  
 Guinn is backing a serious bipartisan move for the 2003 Nevada Legislature to revamp 
 the selection process and the makeup of the board. ‘If the board is not restructured, it will 
 continue to be an embarrassment to the state,’ Guinn says. ‘This arguing back and forth is 
 not an efficient way to handle taxpayer dollars’. (p. 1) 
As chronicled by numerous media articles, Regent Linda Howard had allegedly abused her 
authority, obtaining thousands of UNLV student records; one record was that of a student who 
had called Regent Howard an idiot in a UNLV newspaper editorial. In separate incidences, 
Regent Mark Alden had called Regent Howard an “orangutan” during a morning radio show, and 
Regent Howard Rosenberg had voted on the salary of a UNR vice president, sparking a conflict 
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of interest inquiry. According to the Las Vegas Review-Journal (Patton, 2002), Regent Steve 
Sisolak had gained Chancellor Jane Nichols’ and Regent Chair Doug Seastrand’s approval to 
issue a collective public apology unbeknownst to Regents Howard, Alden, and Rosenberg. 
Shortly after it was issued, Regent Howard told a radio show, “I don’t have anything to 
apologize for, and I think there are a whole lot more apologies that need to come to me” (Patton, 
2002, p. 1). Regent Sisolak then expressed his disappointment that ‘the glue is already 
weakening.’ He stated, “What everyone needs to realize, including myself, is that the whole 
board gets painted with the same brush if there’s a problem with even one regent’s behavior” 
(Patton, 2002, p. 2).    
 Discussion and testimony during two consecutive legislative sessions. During the 2003 
Legislative Session, AJR 11 was twice heard by the Assembly Committee on Elections, 
Procedures, and Ethics and once heard by the Senate Government Affairs Committee. Similarly, 
in 2005, AJR 11 was twice heard by both, the Assembly Committee on Elections, Procedures, 
Ethics, and Constitutional Amendments and Senate Government Affairs Committee. The 
Assembly Committee on Education never heard the bill; and no such committee existed in the 
Senate in 2003 or 2005. During the first session, discussion especially among Senators, exposed 
dissension on dimensions of the policy solution AJR 11 offered. According to legislative 
minutes, Republican Senator William Raggio said, “He supported the idea of a generic bill, 
which would provide for the election of some of the regents with the remaining members to be 
appointed by the governor.” He indicated, “specific qualifications or items mandated for the 
governor” should be deleted. Contrary to her peer, Democrat Senator Dina Titus said, “She 
believed some direction for governors was important. She also said the combination of elected 
and appointed regents would make the board more divided and more difficult to get consensus of 
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opinion.” Thus, she articulated, “She would prefer to elect all regents, but limit the term and 
number of regents.”  
 Public testimony in 2003 mostly opposed AJR 11. Speaking on behalf of the Board of 
Regents during an Assembly committee hearing, Regent Chair Seastrand suggested a 
constitutional amendment was “not to be taken lightly.” He testified the opinion of the regents 
was “that they wanted to be representative of the people. They wanted to be elected by the 
people so that they can respond to the constituencies that they are elected by.” He also 
underscored the Constitution, which had stood for 140 years, and suggested it need not change. 
 I was recently reminded that there were several sections of the Constitution that create 
 different groups in the state: the Legislature, the constitutional officers, the judges, and 
 the regents. We, as regents, even have our own section. In all of those and others, they are 
 all elected, I think that was the foresight of those who framed the Constitution. It’s held 
 for 140 years. We would, as regents, feel that it would not be necessary to make a 
 change. We feel the current authority that this committee [Assembly Elections, 
 Procedures, and Ethics Committee] has, which is setting the size and the term of office, 
 should be sufficient.  
Similar to Regent Sisolak’s earlier sentiment about one regent’s behavior being reflective of the 
whole board, Regent Jill Derby testified:    
 It strikes me that to make radical changes in the system of government of higher 
 education that has really served us very well in Nevada for decades, because of the 
 disappointing actions of a few individuals, is really not well thought out and risks 
 throwing the baby out with the bath water. [ ] If there are problems with board behavior, 
 then it’s really a matter for the board to manage, and we’re in the process of doing that. 
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 To take on a radical change in our structure of higher education without very careful 
 thought worries me very much. 
Besides the Board of Regents, three other groups testified in opposition in 2003: Nevada 
Concerned Citizens, Nevada Eagle Forum, and the Independent American Party. All generally 
expressed concern about Nevada citizens losing representation along with their right to vote for 
regents. On the contrary, Carole Villardo, representing The Nevada Taxpayers Association, 
testified in support of AJR 11 stating, “I think that we’ve reached a point in time where given the 
change with the structure of the university system, given the dollars that are involved, that the 
appointments are a proper way to go.”   
 Discussion and testimony in the 2005 Session committee hearings similarly represented 
mixed perspectives on the policy dimensions of AJR 11. Members new to the Assembly 
committee inquired about the appointment process and board reduction. For example,  Democrat 
Assemblyman Harvey Munford asked Assemblywoman Giunchigliani, “How would you select 
those appointed members?” Minimal discussion occurred among Senators since only one new 
member had joined the Senate committee in 2005. During this Session, no regents offered any 
testimony, however, Vice Chancellor for Legal Affairs, UCCSN, Dan Klaich submitted 
opposition testimony on behalf of Chancellor Jim Rogers and Vice Chancellor Jill Derby. 
 Primarily I am here to enter the chancellor and vice chair’s [chancellor’s] comments into 
 the record. We believe that in the last year, the board has come a long way in restoring its 
 collegiality, its cordiality, and its professionalism. We would encourage you not to react 
 in a way that deprives the people in the state of Nevada of the right to elect their regents 
 for higher education. 
 60 
Likewise, representatives from Nevada Concerned Citizens and Nevada Eagle Forum once again 
testified against AJR 11. Additionally, UNLV faculty member, Dr. Ronald Remington, 
highlighted the Board of Regents’ recent Open Meeting Law violation that had made national 
news, and “he asked the committee if it was ever appropriate for elected officials to deny due 
process, break state law and violate the public trust.” To which, Democrat Terry Senator Care 
said, “There was no guarantee if the bill was passed, it would eliminate bullying or people 
violating the Open Meeting Law.” Despite mixed support across the legislature, AJR 11 passed 
both houses in both Sessions by a constitutional majority, and then subsequently advanced to the 
citizens of Nevada for their vote on Ballot Question No. 9.   
 Ballot question no. 9. Crafted by the Legislative Council Bureau (LCB) and approved by 
the Legislative Commission, Ballot Question No. 9 was one of ten statewide questions the public 
considered in November 2006. Arguments for passage first singled out Nevada’s uniqueness; 
“Nevada is the only state to elect a single board to govern all public institutions of higher 
education” (“Nevada LCB,” n.d., p. 145). It then asserted the governor’s capacity to “appoint 
members with the necessary education, credentials, and experience to administer this complex 
system of higher education.” It also argued the Board of Regents was “too large, making the 
board unworkable” and reducing the term would “make them [regents] more accountable and 
responsive to the voters.” Arguments against passage conveyed taking “from the people their 
right to vote on some members,” “inevitable friction” among blended-board members, reduced 
board responsiveness, and concern that the governor “might appoint only those who share his 
views.” It also argued a “four-year term is too short” to retain “institutional memory” and less 
members would result in “less effective governance.” Finally, it highlighted “neither an elected 
nor an appointed process guarantees a highly qualified board” and suggested “as the number of 
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congressional districts continues to increase, along with Nevada’s growing population, the 
regents would once again become an elected board.”          
 Besides question nine, three other questions originated in the legislature while the 
remainder emerged via state or local level petitions. Questions focused on myriad issues, such as 
priority state funding for K-12 education, minimum wage hike, and marijuana regulation. On 
November 7th, 2006, the public approved five questions, including K-12 funding and minimum 
wage hike, and rejected Ballot Question No. 9, along with marijuana regulation and three other 
questions. As depicted in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, out of 17 counties, only Clark County 
favored question nine and most Clark County legislators supported the measure as well.   
Finding: Insufficient Public Support to Overcome a Structure-Induced Equilibrium 
 Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2009) have contended policy stasis may be driven by a 
structure-induced equilibrium, which according to Shepsle (1979) occurs when “institutional 
arrangements may conspire with the preferences of individuals to produce structure-induced 
equilibrium” (p. 27). The Nevada Constitution long bestowed upon its citizens the right to vote 
for regents. An interview participant alluded to the Constitution’s power in maintaining that 
right. “So I think once it's established that these positions are elected, I think it's hard to change 
that, because people see that generally as taking away a right that they have.” The data suggested 
voters likely rejected AJR 11 because they did not want to give up their right to vote for regents, 
or any other elected officials, historically protected by the Nevada Constitution. This sentiment 
was similarly articulated by five interview participants and discussed by legislators during the 
2003 and 2005 AJR 11 committee hearings. Additionally, absence of both, widespread support 




2006 Public Voting on Ballot Question No. 9 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
County    Yes     No  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Carson City    7,343     9,914 
Churchill    3,424     4,331 
Clark     176,045    161,696 
Douglas    7,788     10,096  
Elko     5,114     6,222   
Esmeralda    145     261 
Eureka     254     428 
Humboldt    1,784     2,475  
Lander     688     1,020 
Lincoln    702     1,064 
Lyon     6,289     7,939 
Mineral    781     1,190 
Nye     5,319     5,925 
Pershing    530     912 
Storey     716     1,067 
Washoe    51,471     61,461 
White Pine    1,414     1,713 
   
Total     269,807    277,714 
Percent    49.28     50.72 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. Adapted from Nevada Secretary of State, 2006 Statewide General Election Results.  
 
Table 2 
2003 and 2005 Clark County Legislators Voting on Ballot Question No. 9 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
              2003      2005 
    ______________________________________________________ 
 
    Yes   No    Yes  No 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Senate    8  6    8  6  
     
Assembly   22  7    24  5 
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to vote ‘no’ on Ballot Question No. 9, buttressed the structure-induced equilibrium provided by 
the Constitution, leading to the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity. 
 Citizens did not want to give up their right vote. Although citizens only narrowly 
defeated AJR 11, data analysis clearly suggested many Nevadans cherished their sovereign right 
to vote for all elected representatives, including the Board of Regents. An interview participant, 
who was part of the Assembly at the time of AJR 11, conveyed:  
 I think the primary issue is it [AJR 11] takes the right away from citizens to vote, and 
 historically in Nevada, Nevadans have liked the right to vote. They like voting for judges. 
 They like to vote for regents. They like to vote for mosquito abatement control board. 
Similarly, another former legislator offered a more recent example, underscoring the public’s 
preference to maintain its voting jurisdiction. 
 We had a bill about fluoridating water, and currently it’s a vote of the people, and we 
 were trying to mandate it. The biggest argument wasn’t even about the positive or 
 negative of the fluoride, it was about, you’re taking away our right to vote. 
Yet, a third former legislator commenting on the defeat of AJR 11 simply stated, “Whether it 
makes sense or not, people like to vote for judges and regents and whatnot. So I do think that 
was a major factor.” Likewise, a higher education official expressed, “…Nevadans have liked to 
elect individuals, even if they don’t understand what they do.”  
 The data also suggested public concern about possible spillover effects into other voting 
arenas if AJR 11 was adopted. A citizen lobbyist testified, “We see a movement, not just on this 
bill, but on others, that would take way our right to vote on different offices in the state of 
Nevada.” She proceeded, “I know this [AJR 11] is well-meaning. We want the very best kind of 
government we can have, and we need to go carefully as we change the Constitution.” She 
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asserted the Constitution was a structure meant to be difficult to change. “The reason it’s hard to 
change the Constitution is because it was meant to be that way, so we can walk carefully towards 
any kind of change that we make…because if you make a mistake, it sure is hard to change.” 
 Coupled with public concern over keeping the right to vote, the data also revealed unease 
over potential loss of public representation associated with governor appointed regents. One 
interviewee highlighted loss of public influence associated with the appointment process.  
 They [public] don’t agree with all this closed shop appointment. They see what happens 
 in the bureaucracy. They see they have little enough to say by electing people. When you 
 have people appointed, you have almost nothing to say. You have no influence.    
This participant suggested appointed members exacerbate public representation. “It just makes it 
farther away from the people, makes it more difficult. You know, you can go and see one person 
that’s on the Board of Regents.” Later, the interviewee underscored, “The more you exclude the 
public, the more private decisions are made by bureaucrats and unelected people. The further 
removed they get from what the people want done with their [taxpayer] money.”  
 Absence of widespread support and no supporting education campaign. Reflecting 
on the months leading up to the ballot measure vote, a higher education official suggested 
absence of widespread support for AJR 11 likely led to the bill’s demise. 
 As I recall, there wasn’t a huge effort to promote the passage of it. I don’t know, people 
 weren’t that interested. As I recall, they didn’t raise a whole bunch of money and start 
 running ads or anything. It just appeared on the ballot and people looked at it and decided 
 without encouragement.  
Similarly, in a 2006 article the Las Vegas Sun imputed paucity of support to the bill sponsor’s 
higher priority campaign of running for county commissioner.  
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 Regents say the hybrid board is a “recipe for disaster,” that forcing regents to run in 
 congressional districts would be too costly, and that despite the past, the board is now 
 functioning fine. If regents aggressively oppose the amendment, they’ll draw attention to 
 it and appear self-serving, several regents told Rosenberg. And because its chief 
 proponent, state Assemblywoman Chris Giunchigliani, D-Las Vegas, is too busy running 
 for Clark County commissioner to campaign in favor of Question 9, they are hoping the 
 bill will fail for lack of interest. (p. 3)  
Besides deficient support, absence of a public education campaign in favor of AJR 11 also likely 
contributed to the bill’s defeat. A former legislator stated, “I think it was just a lack of 
education…that was a bill that needed education.” Articulating the sentiment of two other 
interviewees, the same participant implied without proper messaging it was challenging to gain 
support from a seemingly disengaged public. 
 I don’t know that the public, it doesn’t mean they don’t care. I just don’t know that they 
 necessarily were as engaged as one would think. Because if your kids don’t go to higher 
 ed, they’re not worrying about community college versus where the dollars go. The 
 formula, all those things are nuanced and it depends on how the messaging comes down. 
The interviewee further noted, “It [AJR 11] was not a sexy issue. And so I don’t know that much 
was said one way or another. Because sometimes it’s the jazz or pizazz of a bill that makes it 
noteworthy.” 
 Messaging via the media. Eight days prior to the ballot measure vote, the Las Vegas Sun  
recommended “no” on question nine. Although they supported a board member reduction, they 
suggested the “proposal would create a strange mix of regents - three elected and six appointed - 
and that makes no sense to us, especially as the board has worked together much better since 
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hiring Jim Rogers as chancellor” (2006, p. 2). A couple weeks earlier, the Las Vegas Review-
Journal had also recommended “no” on question nine. “While shrinking the size of the board 
certainly has merit, limiting voter involvement in selecting who oversees Nevada’s higher 
education system is the wrong approach” (2006, p. 8B). Other outlets, such as the Reno Gazette-
Journal, Nevada Appeal, and Las Vegas CityLife, seemed to take no stand on question nine and 
merely summarized the issues for and against AJR 11. Commenting to the Las Vegas Sun in 
2006, on the narrow defeat of AJR 11, Regent Bret Whipple chalked up the close vote “to 
confusing language, and not because of any consensus by the public that there are problems with 
the board” (p. 1). Next, I address AB 331. 
AB 331: A Solution Too Extreme and Complex to Garner Legislative Support 
Officially titled, “Creates the Nevada System of Community Colleges. (BDR 34-28),” 
AB 331 proposed to “transfer authority for the supervision and control of community colleges 
from the Board of Regents to the State Board for Community Colleges and the boards of trustees 
of such community colleges” (p. 2), along with creating an Articulation and Transfer Board. Like 
AJR 11, the legislative policymaking process surrounding AB 331 resulted in the preservation of 
Nevada’s higher education governance entity. Unlike AJR 11, which passed two consecutive 
legislative sessions before it failed, AB 331 died after a single Assembly committee hearing. “It 
never came up for a vote. I personally would have been against it,” a former committee member 
articulated. “I don't remember whether it was the chair, the caucus, or leadership who made that 
decision, but it just wasn't ready. There were too many concerns.” Similarly, another former 
committee member expressed, “It was a huge confusing bill. It would do so many things that it 
was hard to know what you would end up with. The member stated, “I didn’t talk to the chair 
 67 
about why that did not pass. But I would guess that it was a lot to digest. It was a big change. My 
preference before big changes are to study things.” 
The data suggested the separate community college governance structure AB 331 offered 
was a solution too extreme and complex. Moreover, legislators realized the Articulation and 
Transfer Board specifically, could be implemented under the existing governance structure. This 
policy image of the solution along with negotiations that occurred behind the scenes between 
regents and college presidents likely prevented AB 331 from making the legislature’s decision-
making agenda. To a lesser extent, limited supporting testimony and opposition testimony from 
Nevada’s four in situ community college presidents may have also reinforced the preservation of 
Nevada’s postsecondary governance entity. Before expounding on the overall finding and other 
possible contributing factors, I provide a description of the committee hearing and sequence of 
events to contextualize the embedded case of AB 331.  
Setting the Stage: AB 331     
Late afternoon April 3, 2017, midway through the 120-day 79th Legislative Session 
(February 6 through June 6), the Nevada Assembly Committee on Education convened to hear 
testimony on proposed higher education governance reform initiative, AB 331, along with one 
other postsecondary initiative and two K-12 education bills. With the exception of one excused 
assemblywoman, all other 13 members were present. About one hour into the hearing, after first 
addressing both K-12 bills, Democrat Chairman Tyrone Thompson opened the hearing on AB 
331 and guest legislator, Republican Assemblyman Ira Hansen, introduced his bill to a 
committee of eight Democrats and five Republicans. AB 331 discussion lasted one hour and nine 
minutes, nearly half of the hearing’s duration (two hours and twenty-three minutes).  
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Policy problems AB 331 aimed to resolve. According Assemblyman Hansen, AB 331 
sought to fix an archaic postsecondary education system that was “not working efficiently or 
equitably” for the “community colleges as compared to [the] universities.” He testified, “What 
worked in 1968 is no longer working today.” He underscored the recently changed funding 
formula as a specific reason “community colleges are being left behind in terms of equitable 
distribution of funding.” Moreover, he suggested that changing the higher education governance 
structure would address other challenges, “including meeting economic development goals and 
best serving the needs of all Nevada’s students.”  
Three special guests offered opening statements. After a brief bill introduction, 
Assemblyman Hansen’s “three special guests,” Dr. Carol Lucey, President Emeritus of WNC, 
Dr. John Gwaltney, President Emeritus of TMCC, and Dr. Ron Remington, past president of 
both GBC and CSN shared their extensive experience as college presidents in NSHE, as well as 
their postsecondary experience outside the system. All expressed support for separate community 
college governance and their statements centered on what they perceived as weaknesses in the 
Nevada higher education governance system. For example, Dr. Lucey suggested, “most states, 
generally use local community college governance boards to manage their colleges.” She noted, 
“That alignment between local community, college board, and president is indeed what makes 
theses colleges ‘community’ colleges.” She also reported she had resigned shortly after the 2013 
Legislative Session because she had testified in that session in support of Senate Bill (SB) 391, 
which amended, called for an interim study concerning the governance structure of and funding 
methods for the community colleges. “I resigned not long after that, as I knew I would have to 
do. It is important to understand that college presidents cannot disagree with their governing 
boards. When they do, they must be prepared to resign.” In closing, she emphasized, “That 
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should be borne in mind today as you hear opinions on all sides of this issue.” Dr. Gwaltney 
identified the problem as the system. “When you have a system where everybody works hard to 
do a good job and the outcome is not what it should be, that is a problem. The problem is not 
people. The problem is the system.” Dr. Remington, who had previously testified in support of 
AJR 11 in 2005, reported he had 40 years of higher education experience and 30 of those years 
were spent with NSHE. He noted issues within the system had not changed. “Since I date back to 
1973 with service to Nevada, I can tell you that this hearing could have occurred in 1977, 1987, 
1997, 2007, or currently. The issues are the same.”  
Hearing opened for committee members’ questions. After the three special guests 
concluded, Chairman Thompson opened the floor for committee members’ questions. Of the 
thirteen members present, six questioned the former presidents. Assemblywomen Lisa Krasner 
and Amber Joiner, both also NSHE community college instructors, couched their questions in 
their adoration for the role of community colleges. Republican Assemblywoman Krasner stated, 
“I teach at Truckee Meadows Community College, and I love community colleges.” She asked, 
“…will there be enough money for the community colleges if they separate from the university 
system? I certainly would not want anything bad to happen to the community colleges.” 
Democrat Assemblywoman Joiner declared, “This is a really big decision, and one that I do not 
take lightly. Having taught at both the university and at the community college level, I truly just 
want to figure out what is best for community college students.” While Assemblywoman Krasner 
addressed AB 331’s primary proposed solution (i.e., separate community college governance), 
Assemblywoman Joiner emphasized bill sections 146 through 148, the Articulation and Transfer 
Board. She stated: 
 70 
This issue of articulation and transfer is extremely important to me. [ ] If you are saying 
that is one of the problems that students are facing in community colleges that cannot be 
addressed in the current system, I would just like for you to expand on that please. [ ] 
Could we have an Articulation and Transfer Board without breaking up the system? Has 
that been considered?   
Questions from both Assemblymen Edgar Flores and Elliot Anderson centered on their concern 
over testimony about college presidents’ inability to act and speak in the interest of their colleges 
and students, rather than the proposed policy solution. Democrat Assemblyman Flores asked, 
“Would NSHE show up at your door and tell you that if you do not do this, you are out? Would 
they rally troops around you to get you out? Searching for factual evidence, Democrat 
Assemblyman Anderson focused his query on opposition letters the four current community 
college presidents submitted as exhibits to the committee hearing.  
I want to get into the issue where it is sort of being implied that the community colleges 
are not being able to give us their full feelings. That may be true, but do you have 
information specifically that the community college presidents feel differently than what 
we are seeing in the letters? 
Finally, Democrat Assemblyman Edwards asked about the advantages of a separate governance 
structure for community colleges, and the chairman inquired, “When you are talking about that it 
is more local, do we really have the local support and/or capacity to support something as huge 
as this?” 
Supporting testimony. Chairman Thompson then moved on to supporting testimony. 
One private citizen of Carson City and a Nevada Manufacturers Association representative, Mr. 
Ray Bacon, lent support. Mr. Bacon underscored the proposed Articulation and Transfer Board. 
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“A really important point I would like to make is that the articulation board that is in this bill is 
absolutely the number one point.” Besides these testimonials, four private citizens (one a former 
assemblywoman and three associated with Nevada’s colleges) lent support via exhibit letters. 
Opposing testimony. Next, the chairman sought opposing testimony. All four in situ 
college presidents testified against AB 331. Drs. Mark Curtis (GBC) and Michael Richards 
(CSN) testified via videoconference from their colleges, while Drs. Chester Burton (WNC) and 
Karin Hilgersom (TMCC) addressed the legislature in Carson City. Drs. Curtis, Richards, and 
Burton all acknowledged they were on their final NSHE contract, and they highlighted their 
letters of opposition and countered Dr. Lucey’s statement that college presidents cannot disagree 
with their governance board without consequences. As the newest president hired June 2016, Dr. 
Hilgersom indicated she was “…speaking with a new perspective. I believe that the NSHE 
system is working. [ ] No system is perfect. There is a lot of room for improvement within 
NSHE, and I’m hoping that I can help with those improvements in the next several years.” No 
other individuals or groups personally testified against the bill; however, the Executive Director 
of the Northern Nevada Development Authority, who was also the Chairman of Western Nevada 
College’s Institutional Advisory Council (IAC), submitted a letter of opposition. IACs were a 
policy outcome of the 2013 SB 391 interim study of community college governance and funding. 
Closing remarks. With no individuals offering neutral testimony, the chair gave the floor 
to Assemblyman Hansen for closing remarks. However, Assemblyman Flores interjected with a 
follow-up comment for Assemblyman Hansen, “I imagine you had an opportunity to speak with 
NSHE.” Assemblyman Hansen replied:   
On this specific topic, I have not had any conversation with any member. No one 
approached me about this bill. I have not had a single word from anybody in the Nevada 
 72 
System of Higher Education. The answer is that I have not heard a word from anybody as 
far as offering amendments—basically I have not had a word from anybody to amend my 
bill. I am a little mystified as to why none of them showed up to testify against it. They 
obviously had the community college people do that. I hate to answer for them, but it is 
their responsibility to show up.  
Assemblyman Flores emphasized his desire to hear from NSHE and the regents. “Moving 
forward, if I could ask that you please send them an email and let us know.” Assemblyman 
Hansen curtly replied: 
No problem. Sure. Right now, I am sure there are many members that are paying very 
close attention to this hearing, so we will put on the record right now that Assemblyman 
Hansen has reached out formally and publicly. My doors are open and my email is 
irahansen@irahansen.com.  
Then, he presented closing remarks, seizing an opportunity to highlight “scandalous” actions tied 
to the funding formula creation and governance structure and  blaming the regents and chancellor 
for the policy problems AB 331 aimed to resolve. 
It was hinted at in the testimony that we had quite a scandal in Nevada between the 2013 
Session and after the 2015 Session. We found out that the Board of Regents, through the 
Chancellor, had supposedly contacted a completely independent board to review the 
funding mechanism. In addition, critical to this, what we discovered is that this 
independent board was not independent at all. I want to get this on the record. Daniel 
Klaich referred to the "think tank," this independent board, as his special consultant, in a 
message to his confidant, Jane Nichols, who was herself a former chancellor still working 
in the system in a different role. Nichols advised him that the system would "have the 
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ideal outcome of our formula study in our hip pocket." The relationship was so close that 
this organization was actually allowed to use the letterhead of the supposedly 
independent company, write what they wanted on it, then have that so-called independent 
group send it to them as if it was a response after they wrote the answers. What does that 
have to do with this? The funding formula that is in SB 391 of the 77th Session, the 
governance structure, came from where? Remember this governance structure and this 
whole thing was done prior to the exposé that was done by the Las Vegas Review-
Journal. Who came up with the governance structure? None other than the exact same 
group that was in the pocket of the Board of Regents. Lo and behold, they came up with a 
governance structure recommendation which we all received in SB 391 of the 77th 
Session bulletin which you can pick up. What is it? It is ironically, exactly what the 
Board of Regents wanted.  
Finding: A Solution Too Extreme and Complex 
Baumgartner (1989) has suggested political conflict in policymaking entails three areas: 
whether a problem exists, what the best solution is, and what the best means of implementation 
are (as cited in Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). AB 331 made the legislature’s policy agenda so the 
existence of a problem was not in dispute. In fact, a former legislator articulated: 
I get why the community colleges came. I think it's the funding issue and a priority issue.  
They really saw the Board of Regents make that shift to not giving them enough funding,  
not giving them enough authority to self-direct.  
Even two of the four sitting college presidents, Drs. Burton and Hilgersom, acknowledged in 
their testimony the good intentions of the bill despite their opposition. The data suggested the 
separate community college governance structure AB 331 offered was a solution too extreme 
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and complex. Moreover, legislators learned the Articulation and Transfer Board specifically, 
could be implemented under the existing governance system. This policy image of the solution 
along with negotiations that occurred behind the scenes between regents and college presidents 
likely prevented AB 331 from making the legislature’s decision-making agenda. To a lesser 
extent, limited supporting testimony and opposition testimony from Nevada’s four in situ 
community college presidents may have also contributed to the preservation of Nevada’s 
postsecondary governance entity. 
An extreme and complex solution. For some legislators, the policy solution of separate 
governance for Nevada’s four community colleges was too extreme and complex. During one 
interview, a former legislator expressed their primary angst with AB 331: 
My biggest concern was that if they were to break off, which we have seen in other 
states, and I remember reading and being informed about how it didn't go well with other 
states sometimes with schools broke off. It worked okay in California I think. But in 
other places, what happens when they break off then, is then they are battling against the 
main Board of Regents to the legislature for funding. I almost felt like they were putting 
themselves at a disadvantage. 
“To break off” explicitly suggested a drastic solution, which might “disadvantage” the 
community colleges. This same participant later shared, “I didn't think it was well structured. I 
thought it was a little bit too premature to break them off. Because it seems like their issues 
could be fixed, or reformed.” 
 Queries from Assemblywoman Krasner and Chairman Thompson during the hearing 
focused on the solution’s feasibility. Assemblywoman Krasner asked, “Will there be enough 
money for the community colleges if they separate from the university system.” To which, Dr. 
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Gwaltney replied that they were not suggesting an increase in funding. They were “convinced if 
the community college bill is successful, all of the necessary funding that goes to NSHE is not 
necessary anymore.” The new community college governance structure he indicated:  
…will take roughly 51% of all students out of the system. It would strike me as highly 
unlikely that all the work being done by NSHE would have been done for only the 
universities and therefore, the system could not up any funds that support that. We do not 
really see any additional expenditure from the state right now.  
Almost contradictory however, he suggested:  
… life might be a little messier in the future because community college presidents will 
bring their priorities here to you directly in the next session and the session after that. 
They will not be laundered through a university-centered system. At some point, I think 
the funding might change. 
Chairman Thompson asked, “When you are talking about that it is more local, do we really have 
the local support and/or capacity to support something as huge as this?” Following Dr. Lucey’s 
response about communities having “buy-in that they now lack,” the chairman followed-up. “I 
am talking money. Support and encouragement are one thing. But having the actual dollars is 
what I want to talk about.” Dr. Lucey then highlighted Washington state, which AB 331 was 
modeled after, however, in closing she questioned whether she had answered the chairman’s 
question and reiterated her initial response about local support via “buy-in.” 
The colleges survive on tuition and their general fund dollars. In exchange for that, there 
is no local election, for example, of the Board of Trustees at those colleges. They are 
gubernatorial appointments, which is why you see ‘gubernatorial appointment’ in this 
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board. I am not sure if I have answered your question, but I think you see buy-in when 
you see that the community has something to say about their college. 
Immediately after Dr. Lucey’s response, Chairman Thompson moved to supporting testimony. 
Besides the extreme nature of AB 331, the complexity of the bill likely contributed to its 
demise. During the bill’s introduction, the bill sponsor began by jokingly stating, at the request 
of the committee chairman, he would go through the entire bill, “all 325 sections of it.” 
Responding to a room full of laughter, the chairman half-chuckled, “That was not the request. 
Wrong email.” When pointing out some of the most pertinent sections of the bill, Assemblyman 
Hansen underscored section 146, which created the Articulation and Transfer Board. In essence, 
he prioritized this dimension of the complex solution, by emotionally appealing to his fellow 
legislators, some of whom were also community college instructors. “I want to emphasize the 
importance of this board in addressing problems and challenges that we have seen when students 
attempt to transfer from community colleges to universities, not to mention from high school to 
college.” At least one committee member latched on to this idea, and when the hearing was 
opened for members’ questions, the legislature discovered this dimension of the solution could 
be implemented without passage of AB 331. By reframing and reducing her initial three-part 
question to a single question, Assemblywoman Joiner ascertained from Dr. Gwaltney that “it is 
possible” to have an Articulation and Transfer Board, as portrayed in AB 331 and modeled after 
the state of Florida ,“under the current system without breaking the community colleges off.” 
 Negotiations behind the scenes. During one interview, a former legislator reported 
negotiations behind the scenes may have been a reason why the sitting college presidents 
opposed AB 331. Moreover, this participant suggested the regents’ appointment of a Vice 
Chancellor for Community Colleges increased the colleges’ power within the system.  
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They did get some things out of this bill. For example, I know that the Board of Regents 
appointed a vice chancellor, a very high level person who is in charge of community 
colleges now. It is possible that they negotiated behind the scenes with the Regents and 
said, ‘if we come out against this bill because it's too extreme or too big of a change, will 
you give us things?’ They absolutely got a Vice Chancellor for Community Colleges and 
an entire board that the vice chancellor oversees that’s advisory. So, they did gain power 
within the system, and that may have been why they were okay with the bill dying. They 
absolutely got things out of this bill, though, not legislatively. There was negotiation 
behind the scenes for sure. 
Similarly, another interviewee suggested: 
…the changes made within the system addressed the concerns that the legislative 
sponsors had as far as the Vice Chancellor for Community College's emphasis on the 
community college committee and community college issues coming forward. So I think 
in that case there were specific issues that the legislators wanted addressed and the board 
addressed them. 
 From this participant’s perspective, these antecedent actions by the Board of Regents may have 
been a reason why AB 331 died in Assembly. 
Finally and to a lesser extent, limited supporting testimony primarily from three past 
college presidents and opposition testimony from Nevada’s four in situ community college 
presidents may have reinforced the preservation of Nevada’s postsecondary governance entity. 
However, a former Assembly member suggested, “Sometimes, bills just aren't ready. It isn't that 
there's a huge clear opposition that kills it. Sometimes, it's just like, we need to think about this 
more, and it [AB 331] was a really big decision.” Next I address the final embedded case, AJR 5. 
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AJR 5: Unconventional Tactics May Induce Policy Punctuation and Reform   
 Authorized to be cited as the Nevada Higher Education Reform, Accountability and 
Oversight Amendment, AJR 5, has unprecedentedly proposed to “amend the Nevada Constitution 
to remove the constitutional provisions governing the election and duties of the Board of Regents 
of the State University and to authorize the Legislature to provide by statute for the governance, 
control and management of the State University and for the reasonable protection of individual 
academic freedom” (p. 1). Unlike the outcome of AJR 11 and AB 331, both of which resulted in 
the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity, the outcome of AJR 5 is still 
undecided since the public will not vote on the bill until November 2020 (see Appendix G for 
attempts at punctuations). Consequently, data analysis of the AJR 5 embedded case singularly 
addressed my secondary research question: how is the legislative policymaking process of the 
ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or 
different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331, 
two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed?  
 An extensive analysis of data suggested AJR 5 cosponsors’ unconventional tactics used 
to define the policy image of Nevada’s postsecondary governance system were pivotal in 
mobilizing sufficient legislative support in two consecutive Sessions and may favorably sway 
voters in November 2020, ultimately inducing for the first time, a policy punctuation and higher 
education governance reform. Specifically, AJR 5 cosponsors cleverly designed a policy solution 
to explicitly exclude any public loss of voting rights. AJR 5 also appeared to benefit both 
legislature and faculty, thus aiding legislators’ adoption of the bill. Cosponsors’ use of historical 
court case analogies during committee hearings (Taliaferro, 1994) likely helped establish a 
favorable reference from which legislators could evaluate problems AJR 5 aimed to resolve (as 
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cited in Zahariadis, 2003). Finally, their strategic manipulation of sequential decision-making, 
known as a salami tactic (Zahariadis, 2003), presumably facilitated the legislature’s passage of 
AJR 5. In the next two sections, I first set the stage, outlining relevant events associated with the 
policymaking process of AJR 5. Then, I address the finding, highlighting how the policymaking 
process of AJR 5 mostly differed from the policymaking processes of AJR 11 and AB 331.  
Setting the Stage: AJR 5 
 On March 2, 2017, early into the 120-day 80th Legislative Session (February 6 through 
June 6), Democrat Chairwoman Olivia Diaz convened the Nevada Assembly Committee on 
Legislative Operations and Elections to hear nearly ninety minutes of testimony on AJR 5. After 
five minutes spent addressing two other bills, the eleven-person committee, comprised of seven 
Democrats and four Republicans, stood at ease an additional five minutes, awaiting arrival of 
AJR 5 cosponsor Democratic Senator Joyce Woodhouse. Around 1:50 p.m. the Senator kicked 
off the hearing with a brief three minute introduction, and then cosponsor Assemblyman Elliot 
Anderson specifically addressed AJR 5 for eight minutes. According to Senator Woodhouse, 
AJR 5 was part of “a two-piece Nevada higher education reform act in response to recent 
events.” While AJR 5 called for constitutional change, AB 390 sought to create a statutory 
Spending and Government Efficiency Commission for NSHE and expand whistleblower 
protections for system employees “to include disclosure of any information involving false or 
misleading statements made to the Legislature.” The Assembly unanimously approved AB 390, 
however, the Senate never voted on it, thus the statutory piece of the higher education reform act 
ceased in 2017. On the contrary, AJR 5 overwhelmingly passed two consecutive Sessions with 
bipartisan support, and twice amended, it aimed to remove the Board of Regents from the 
Constitution and enshrine academic freedom.  
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 Policy problems AJR 5 aimed to resolve. According to the cosponsors’ 2017 opening 
testimony, the problems AJR 5 aimed to resolve included NSHE’s unacceptable behavior, the 
legislature’s access to information, and Nevada’s antiquated constitutional governance of higher 
education. Similar to Assemblyman Hansen’s AB 331 closing remarks, Senator Woodhouse 
emphasized NSHE’s recent unacceptable behavior. She stated, “In the lead-up to this session and 
previous sessions, the Nevada System of Higher Education tried to control, alter, and 
misrepresent information provided to policymakers, including the legislature. Obviously, this is 
unacceptable.” Although she commended Regent Chair Rick Trachok and Acting Chancellor 
John White for “taking interim steps to correct some of these issues,” she noted, “… as 
policymakers, we must stay focused on building systems, not on individual personalities. Today 
we are not talking about personalities; we are talking about the system.” She continued, “We 
owe the citizens of Nevada a culture of accountability in all levels of government. The higher 
education system belongs to all Nevadans.” Assemblyman Anderson focused on what he 
perceived as Nevada’s archaic approach to postsecondary governance. He articulated, 
“Constitutional governance serves as an antiquated way to govern higher education.” He 
suggested, “The only reason that it [Board of Regents] is in the Nevada Constitution in the first 
place was to access the Land-Grant College Act of 1862 upon getting statehood without any 
action on the part of the legislature.” As he continued, he opined about what he believed was a 
misinterpretation of the original intent of the drafters of the Constitution. He suggested drafters’ 
had not intended to preclude the legislature’s role in postsecondary governance despite the 
provision which stated, “The Legislature shall provide for the establishment of a State University 
which shall be under the control of the Board of Regents.” Then, he indicated that notion of 
exclusion existed today and was an impediment to postsecondary governance reform. 
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   [The provision] is often used to obstruct efforts to align higher education governance and 
 administration with the state’s demographic and economic needs. Indeed, NHSE 
 regularly interprets this provision very expansively to suggest that it is the fourth branch 
 of government, extending the constitutional authority of the Board of Regents to govern 
 the three branches of the University of Nevada: UNR, UNLV, and DRI. [ ] In short, this  
 provision has become an impediment to reform. 
He also contended an elected part-time board whose majority of members lacked higher 
education policy background “is unable to manage the sprawling higher education apparatus that 
has flourished under these arrangements. In practice, this arrangement results in too strong of an 
education bureaucracy.” He pointed to Nevada’s low higher education performance. “…Nevada 
is a bottom-dweller in higher education performance and is the only state of its size without a 
university attaining top Carnegie classification rankings.” He said, “It is time Nevada changes 
the way that higher education is organized.” According to Assemblyman Anderson, AJR 5 “is an 
important step in doing so. It will provide the flexibility to the Legislature to consider different 
alternatives for the structure for our system in line with much of the discussion that has happened 
over the past five years.”   
 Discussion and testimony in the 2017 committee hearings. During the 2017 Session, 
AJR 5 was twice heard by both Assembly and Senate Committees on Legislative Operations and 
Elections. Similar to AJR 11 hearings, neither house Committees on Education heard AJR 5 
despite the policy implications for higher education. In the Senate, AJR 5 discussion largely 
focused on the bill’s inclusion of a resolution name, i.e., Nevada Higher Education Reform, 
Accountability and Oversight Amendment, and whether the name matched the bill text. Much of 
the Assembly’s discussion focused on educating legislators about what AJR 5 did and did not 
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propose to do, especially as it related to citizens’ right to vote for the Board of Regents. Central 
to discussion was a historical case law presentation on the constitutional balance of power 
between the legislature and Board of Regents LCB legal analyst Kevin Powers provided at the 
committee chair’s request.  
 The first Assembly hearing on AJR 5 in 2017. From the very first AJR 5 hearing, bill 
cosponsors adamantly stated they were not seeking a constitutional change to the Board of 
Regents election process. Assemblyman Anderson reiterated the same general message on 
several occasions.  
 We are not seeking to get rid of elections for the Board of Regents. There are statutes on 
 point that provide for the election of the Board of Regents. We are not proposing to 
 change that whatsoever. I want to make sure that is very clear to the committee because 
 there has been some confusion on that. 
Offering further assurances, Chairwoman Diaz at one point asked, “Just so the record is clear, 
this bill does not seek to change the ability to elect the Board of Regents. Is that correct?” 
Assemblyman Anderson replied, “That is correct,” and Mr. Powers confirmed it as well, citing 
the current Nevada statute. “Assemblyman Anderson is referencing Nevada Revised Statutes 
(NRS) 396.040. It provides that the Board of Regents consists of 13 members elected by the 
registered voters within the districts described in that chapter of NRS.” 
 Prior to opening the floor for members’ questions, Chairwoman Diaz invited Mr. Powers 
“to comment on the balance of authority between the Legislature and the Board of Regents.” He 
began, “First and foremost, there is no such thing as a fourth branch of government. I cannot say 
that emphatically enough. Nor is there any entity that is independent of the three branches of 
government.” He indicated the Board of Regents was an entity under the Executive Branch, 
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charged with “carrying out and enforcing the law governing higher education.” Then he 
delineated the balance of authority between the board and legislature. 
 The framers in the Nevada Constitution took a slice of the sovereign power given to the 
 Executive Branch and dedicated that to the Board of Regents. That slice of sovereign 
 power from the Executive Branch is narrow in scope for the Board of Regents. It only 
 applies to the internal management of the internal affairs of the university. By contrast, 
 the Legislature retains all inherent sovereign power of the people except where expressly 
 limited by the Nevada Constitution or the U.S. Constitution. 
He suggested the board’s “slice of sovereign power” limited the legislature’s ability to legislate, 
and articulated, “The question that has persisted over the years in Nevada is what is the extent of 
the limitation on the Legislature's power with regard to the governance of the university?” After 
citing two cases (see Appendix H for case histories), King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533 
(1948) and Board of Regents v. Oakley, 637 P.2d 1199 (1981), both of which entailed Nevada 
court interpretations of the Board of Regents’ powers, he specified AJR 5. 
 With regard to AJR 5, the proposal is to remove the Board of Regents from the Nevada 
 Constitution, but not to remove the Board of Regents from the law. By removing the 
 Board of Regents from the Nevada Constitution, it is no longer a constitutionally-created 
 body that has a sovereign slice of constitutional power. Instead, it will be like any other 
 state Executive Branch agency created by statute. It will be subject to the governance, 
 control, and management of the Legislature through the enactment of statutes. [ ] It could 
 still exercise its statutory power, but it would not have that constitutional barrier. 
 Therefore, the Board of Regents would be subject to the entire power and authority of the 
 Legislature through regularly enacted statutes. 
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No groups outside of the legislature testified in support of AJR 5 during the initial Assembly 
hearing, however, several committee members articulated their support. Assemblyman Ira 
Hansen, who would later present AB 331 to the Assembly Education Committee, backed AJR 5 
and suggested the cosponsors “…better come up with some way to put a little oil on troubled 
waters because it is clear that the number one reason people are objecting to this whole idea is 
that they do not want to lose the right to vote for people who are going to represent them on the 
Board of Regents.” Democrat committee members Skip Daly and Shannon Bilbray-Axelrod also 
voiced their support for AJR 5. 
 Speaking on behalf of the board, Regent Vice Chair Allison Stephens and Regent Jason 
Geddes testified in opposition. Their testimony favorably characterized the board’s slice of 
sovereign power and countered cosponsors’ earlier points, such as the Board of Regents as a 
fourth branch of government. Regent Vice Chair Stephens spoke first. 
 Right now, we have a Board of Regents whose sole function is to study and understand 
 higher education and all the intricacies that are involved therein. We started talking about 
 things like curriculum, tenure, shared governance, and workforce development. Those are 
 the only issues that we are focused on. That is the only charge that we have, in addition to 
 the fiduciary responsibility. The governance by a Board of Regents allows for that 
 specialized attention, but it also ensures that higher education governance remains 
 responsive to the public. 
Regent Geddes noted the board’s opposition to the bill text as written and initially amended, 
“…we do not think it is clear that the voting right will stay in perpetuity, which the Nevada 
Constitution holds.” Similarly, both State Chairman of the Independent American Party and State 
President for Nevada Families for Freedom opposed AJR 5. The state president testified, “I 
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would be far more comfortable with AJR 5 if it actually said that the election of the Board of 
Regents would be guaranteed in the future. That is our most significant concern.” It was only 
during this first AJR 5 hearing that the Las Vegas Metro Chamber of Commerce offered neutral 
testimony; for all future testimony in both Sessions they lent support. The member stated the 
Vegas Chamber believed “…the Nevada Constitution clearly states that the Board of Regents 
already falls under the purview of Nevada's Legislature according to Article 11, Section 4 and 
Section 7.” The Nevada Faculty Alliance (NFA) also testified neutral during the initial hearing. 
The rep noted it was “partly because of uncertainty regarding the effect and intent of the 
proposed and amended resolution.” He continued, “We have learned more here, but we have 
serious general concerns. We strongly believe that having universities and colleges that are 
independent of political influence is extremely important.” Closing, he repeated NFA’s position 
adding, “… but we have strong concerns about taking out that small sliver of independence of 
the Board of Regents, particularly for the higher education system that is really special in its 
duties and responsibilities to the students and the citizens of Nevada.” In her closing remarks, 
Senator Woodhouse hinted at future amendments to AJR 5. “…We have been taking notes about 
the concerns that have been raised. Assemblyman Anderson and I will be working on some 
possible additional amendments to this measure, and we will bring something back to you.” 
 Discussion and testimony in the 2019 committee hearings. In 2019, AJR 5 was again 
twice heard by the Assembly Legislative Operations and Election Committee, and once by the 
Senate Committees on Legislative Operations and Elections. AJR 5 was also mentioned during a 
Senate Finance Committee meeting although the bill had no associated fiscal notes. Across both 
houses, AJR 5 hearings were quite similar in format and messaging. The six-member Senate 
committee welcomed four new Senators, of which one (James Ohrenschall) had previously sat 
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on the Assembly committee in 2017. The ten-member Assembly committee experienced a 
turnover of seven members.    
 The first Assembly hearing on AJR 5 in 2019. Much of the discussion in 2019 echoed 
discussion that had occurred during the 2017 Session. Bill cosponsors reiterated the same points 
they had previously made, and once again, invited-LCB legal analyst Mr. Powers offered a 
similar historical perspective, however, this time he added a third case, State ex rel. Richardson 
v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 144, 147-48 (1953). He emphasized, “In that case, which is typical 
for the Board of Regents, they relied on the King case and argued that the Board of Regents, 
because it is a constitutional body, is beyond any control of the courts.”  
 Now a private citizen, Mr. Elliot Anderson addressed the bill’s newest policy dimension, 
academic freedom, which was a 2017 amendment not widely discussed in that Session. He 
stated, “As an additional benefit…we also included a provision in AJR 5 of the 79th Session that 
would constitutionally enshrine academic freedom for Nevada faculty members to ensure that 
political influence cannot rear its head in the teaching process.” He also addressed arguments 
previously given in opposition to AJR 5. For example, he noted in 2017, the regents had argued 
that the Board of Regents should remain in the Constitution because “the Legislature was too 
political.” He stated, “I have already noted that this was not the framers' intent. The Nevada 
Constitution never intended for the Board of Regents to be insulated from the political process.” 
He added, AJR 5 “will allow our state to design a higher education system from the ground up, 
without regard to what settlers from 1864 thought about what we should be doing in 2019.”  
 Just as Chairwoman Diaz had asked to make the record clear in 2017, her successor, 
Democrat Chairwoman Sandra Jauregui, articulated, “I want to make the record clear. If this bill 
passes, it does not seek to change the ability to elect the Board of Regents. Is that correct?” To 
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which, Mr. Powers responded, “That is correct. The existing statutes in place would remain in 
place if this were to be approved by the voters.” Then, he emphasized AJR 5 passage would give 
future legislatures power to make the Board of Regents an appointed body or hybrid board via 
statutes rather than having to amend the Constitution. 
  Of course—I just want to emphasize—the Legislature would be free to change those 
 statutes if it wanted to, but that would be a legislative policymaking choice. It could 
 move the Board of Regents from an elected body to an appointed body, or a hybrid body 
 where some members were elected and some members were appointed. Assembly Joint 
 Resolution 5 of the 79th Session itself does not do that; it just gives the Legislature the 
 power to do that. 
Chairwomen Jauregui also inquired how AJR 5 passage “would alter the relationship between 
the Board of Regents and the Executive Branch?” To which, Mr. Powers replied: 
 Right now, the Governor does not typically have much of a role in the operation or 
 management of the Board of Regents. [ ] Because the Board of Regents has that slice of 
 sovereign power, it maintains its own internal separation from other agencies in the 
 Executive Branch. If this constitutional amendment were approved by the voters and 
 became part of the Nevada Constitution, the Legislature, by setting the policy, could 
 give other officers and agencies in the Executive Branch, like the Governor, more of a 
 role in the administration and operation of the university. 
All in all, Chairwoman Jauregui asked eight questions, which monopolized most of the hearing 
except for two points of clarification from Republican Assemblyman Tom Roberts and Democrat 
Assemblywoman Selena Torres.  
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 The differences between 2017 and 2019 Assembly hearings. In contrast to the absence 
of supporting testimony during the first 2017 Assembly committee hearing, the 2019 hearing  
witnessed a conglomerate of supporting testimony, including guest legislator Assemblywoman 
Bilbray-Axelrod and representatives from the Vegas Chamber, The Lincy Institute, and Council 
for a Better Nevada. Instead of neutrality, the NFA now opposed AJR 5. The rep stated in part 
that removing the board from the Constitution entirely would make NSHE like any other 
Executive Branch entity. “It will increase the possibility that a future Governor will seek to 
control curricular and promotion decisions, or will seek to remove a regent, chancellor, 
president, or even a faculty member, as can happen with other Executive Branch boards.” 
However, the rep suggested, “The NFA could possibly support a revised constitutional 
amendment that would make explicit the authority for the Legislature to set the number and 
method of selection of regents without eliminating the Board of Regents entirely from the 
Nevada Constitution, [ ].” The regents also switched their position from opposition to neutral, 
indicating board members had not taken a position at the time of the hearing. Ultimately, AJR 5 
overwhelmingly passed both houses in 2019, securing its path to a ballot measure vote by the 
people in November 2020.   
Finding: Unconventional Tactics May Induce Policy Punctuation and Reform    
 Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have contended “argumentation and creation of a new 
understanding of an issue are at the heart of the political process” (p. 29). Thus, they have argued 
policymaking is strongly shaped by changing definitions of both problems and solutions, and 
“any time political actors can introduce new dimensions of conflict, they can destabilize a 
previously stable situation” (p. 14). An extensive analysis of data suggested unlike policymaking 
of AJR 11 and AB 331, AJR 5 cosponsors’ unconventional tactics used to define the policy 
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image of Nevada’s postsecondary governance system were pivotal in mobilizing sufficient 
legislative support in two consecutive Sessions and may favorably sway voters in November 
2020, ultimately inducing for the first time, a policy punctuation and higher education 
governance reform. Specifically, AJR 5 cosponsors cleverly designed a policy solution to 
explicitly exclude any public loss of voting rights. AJR 5 also appeared to benefit both 
legislature and faculty, thereby aiding legislators’ adoption of the bill. Cosponsors’ use of 
historical court case analogies during committee hearings (Taliaferro, 1994) likely helped 
establish a favorable reference from which legislators could evaluate problems AJR 5 aimed to 
resolve (as cited in Zahariadis, 2003). Finally, their strategic manipulation of sequential decision-
making, known as a salami tactic (Zahariadis, 2003), presumably facilitated the legislature’s 
passage of AJR 5.  
 Clever policy design. Unlike AJR 11 in which a single bill sponsor offered a policy 
solution unacceptable to voters since it removed their right to vote for some regents, AJR 5 
cosponsors cleverly designed a policy solution without any apparent detriment to the public’s 
right to vote. In fact, AJR 5 testimony was replete with assurances that the bill does not explicitly 
change the Board of Regents election process. An interviewed higher education official 
articulated, “…in 2019, especially in the Assembly, it was very clear that, ‘No, no, we don’t 
want to take away the right to vote. No, no, we’re not going to change the fact that they’re 
elected’.” Similarly, a legislator declared, “When Senator Woodhouse and Assemblyman 
Anderson testified on AJR 5, they were very clear in that they would not remove the ability for 
people to elect the Board of Regents…They were very, very clear on that.” The legislator stated, 
“…we passed AJR 5 out of committee and onto the floor and we all voted on it, again, with the 
understanding that we wouldn’t be removing the electability part from the board.” 
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 The cosponsors also crafted AJR 5 to explicitly benefit the legislature and faculty. One 
interviewee noted a benefit for the legislature. With AJR 5’s passage,  “…there would be a lot 
more oversight from the legislature and that’s what the legislature is seeking.” Moreover, with 
the removal of the Board of Regents from the Constitution, AJR 5 would abolish the board’s 
“sovereign slice of power.” It would also remove the provision bill cosponsors have indicated is 
an “impediment to reform.” Thus, as one interviewee stated, AJR 5 passage will make the 
legislature’s job “easier” and “far more flexible.” By enshrining academic freedom, cosponsors 
aimed to benefit faculty. In his 2019 testimony, Mr. Anderson stated, “As an additional benefit, 
in the 79th Session, we also included a provision in AJR 5 of the 79th Session that would 
constitutionally enshrine academic freedom for Nevada faculty members to ensure that political 
influence cannot rear its head in the teaching process.” However, the LCB legal analyst testified 
it would be up to future legislatures to define “reasonableness of academic freedom.” An 
interview participant suggested inclusion of academic freedom was unnecessary and was likely 
added to gain faculty support. The individual noted because academic freedom for faculty is 
“well enshrined by the first amendment, by case law, and as promulgated by the AAUP 
statement on academic freedom and tenure” it “does not need to be enshrined in the Nevada 
Constitution for it to exist anyway.” Continuing, the person stated, “So putting that in the 
Constitution, first of all, that was added without input from faculty groups. I believe Elliot 
Anderson thought he was throwing faculty a bone to do that. [ ] So if it really does that, great. 
Similarly, another participant suggested, academic freedom was added “to try and get the faculty 
to go neutral on the bill.”  
 Historical case analogies. In contrast to AJR 11 and AB 331, historical case analogies 
were another tactic bill cosponsors used during committee hearings that likely persuaded 
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legislators to support AJR 5. Taliaferro (1994) has argued such an analogy may help establish a 
reference from which policymakers can evaluate decision problems (as cited in Zahariadis, 
2003). During committee hearings across both Sessions, LCB legal analyst shared historical case 
information about “why the Board of Regents is in the Nevada Constitution and how the Board's 
powers have been interpreted by the courts in Nevada.” He surmised, “What I think the case law 
illustrates is that, indeed the courts have, in the end, favored the Legislature when it comes to 
laws of general applicability. What it also illustrates is that the Board of Regents will probably 
litigate each time the Legislature passes a statute that it thinks, in even the slightest way, 
interferes with the Board of Regents' powers.” Several interview participants similarly 
highlighted the analyst’s testimony, as they explained problems AJR 5 proposed to solve. For 
example, one interviewee stated, “All the cases that flow sort of like a tree. The base of the tree 
is King versus Board of Regents, and then other branches have formed that initially track back to 
that King versus Board of Regents. The individual indicated, “oftentimes in the past, the regents 
and the system of higher education have threatened to sue whenever the legislature tries to 
reform. They try to use the Constitution as a sword to defeat those.” Another interviewee 
acknowledged the historical analogies, stating “They used some examples during the hearing 
where the Board of Regents kind of felt that they were autonomous and that they didn’t have any 
other branch of government overseeing them [ ].” This participant indicated, AJR 5 passage 
would result in clear roles, “that the Board of Regents isn’t a fourth branch of government…” 
 Salami tactic. Unlike AJR 11 and AB 331 policymaking, a third tactic AJR 5 cosponsors 
seemingly employed to facilitate passage of AJR 5 through the legislature is what Zahariadis 
(2003) has called a salami tactic. He contends strategic entrepreneurs generally have a grand 
policy design and desired outcome. Since they are certain their preferred solution will not be 
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adopted because it is too risky, they divide decision-making into discrete stages, sequentially 
presenting decisions to policymakers. “Doing so promotes agreement in steps” (p. 93). By the 
time policymakers realize they have been manipulated, it is too late to switch alternatives. Thus, 
“they end up accepting an outcome in steps that they would have rejected as a whole” (p. 93).  
 While the 2019 legislature was considering AJR 5, Senator Woodhouse introduced to the 
Senate Committee on Education SB 354, a follow-on bill to AJR 5. SB 354 mirrored AJR 11 in 
that it called for an appointed-elected hybrid board with less members and shorter terms. 
Republican Senator Keith Pickard liked the idea of a hybrid board however, he noted his 
constituents liked to vote for regents, and then he asked, “Is SB 354 intended to be a placeholder 
for how we begin or is this part of a bigger plan that we are not all aware of at this time?” 
Senator Woodhouse replied in part, SB 354 was being presented now “…based on some 
concerns that came forward because of AJR 5 and how it would be viewed when it was 
presented to the voters in November 2020. There were concerns that there may be some 
disconnect.” Ultimately, the Senate approved SB 354 fifteen to six.   
 A week later, Senator Woodhouse introduced SB 354 to the Assembly Legislative 
Operations Committee. Like legislators who had supported parts of AJR 11, some committee 
members favored board downsizing, but opposed SB 354’s hybrid concept. Assemblywoman 
Torres stated, “If we wanted this to be a part of the legislation, to be a part of that joint 
resolution, I feel that we should have included that in the discussion two years ago, quite 
frankly.” Assemblyman Roberts noted, “I probably would not have supported the first bill [AJR 
5] had I known this was going to be at the same time or contingent or connected to it.” Even 
Senator Woodhouse’s AJR 5 cosponsor opposed SB 354. Mr. Anderson testified: 
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 I am here to testify against SB 354 in its current form. First, I would like to say that I 
 really take no joy in being here. I am a bit dumbfounded about the whole situation and 
 wish that this did not have to happen. 
He underscored Nevadans’ voting history on bills that sought to remove their right to vote.  
 Recent Nevada history bears out a proposition, a proposition that I did not think needed 
 to be stated out loud: The people will not vote to get rid of their ability to select their own 
 representatives. The proposition of appointed regents died on the ballot in 2006, and the 
 proposition of appointed judges died even more overwhelmingly in 2010. And I forgot to 
 mention that the proposition of appointed Regents died in the Legislature in 2009 when 
 Senator Raggio tried to pass it for a second time. I believe he got it through 2007, but 
 then it died on the ballot. I believe the Senate voted it down in 2009, if I recall my history 
 correctly. I would note that since 2010, the electorate has grown more hostile, both on the 
 left and the right, to this sort of a proposal. It is a very populist electorate.  
Then, he noted SB 354 passage would make public approval of AJR 5 nearly impossible, and he 
implied AJR 5 would not have passed two consecutive Sessions had it called for a hybrid board.   
 It [SB 354] will make AJR 5 of the 79th Session difficult, if not impossible, to pass. 
 Moreover, having spoken to 61 legislators personally about AJR 5 of the 79th Session 
 last session, I do not think AJR 5 of the 79th Session would have passed last session if 
 appointed Regents were in the mix.  
In closing, AJR 5 cosponsor asked committee members to focus on the grand design to reform 
higher education rather than narrowly focusing on SB 354, which stood to jeopardize AJR 5. 
 Senate Bill 354 is an impediment to changing history and charting a new course for 
 higher education. It is time to look forward and not send mixed messages to the voters. 
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 The Legislature needs to focus on the power of the institution to reform higher education 
 and not too narrowly on those details at this point. Senate Bill 354 risks all that we have 
 achieved the last two sessions, and the Legislature needs to spend a great deal more time 
 considering 49 other models that are out there before making these changes. 
SB 354 never made it out of the Assembly committee. However, some interview participants 
suggested it may be back in the 2021 Session, presuming the public approves AJR 5.    
Summary 
 
 The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s 
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium 
theory. The primary research question that guided this study was: How has the state of Nevada’s 
legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education 
governance entity? A secondary question asked: How is the legislative policymaking process of 
the ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to 
and/or different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly 
Bill 331, two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed? Three 
overarching themes emerged from extensive data analysis: (1) public support of AJR 11 was 
insufficient to overcome a structure-induced equilibrium created by the Nevada Constitution; (2) 
the policy solution AB 331 offered was too extreme and complex to garner legislative support; 
and (3) perchance, unconventional tactics AJR 5 cosponsors used in the legislative policymaking 
process of AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation that ultimately reforms 
Nevada’s higher education governance entity. In the next chapter, I discuss the findings and their 









 Since McLendon (2003b) first reported a dearth of scholarship focusing on state-level 
policymaking processes to reform higher education governance, few studies have sought to 
address this gap (McLendon, 2003a; Mills, 2007; Tandberg & Anderson, 2012). Similar to these 
studies, this case study aimed to address McLendon’s call for research by examining the 
policymaking process of three legislative bills that have sought to reform Nevada’s statewide 
postsecondary governance entity. In contrast to these studies, however, this research study 
examined state-level policymaking that primarily resulted in policy stasis, rather than policy 
change. This chapter is comprised seven sections. In the first section I provide a brief overview 
of the study. Then, I discuss the answers to my research questions, followed by implications for 
policy, practice, and theory, respectively. In the fifth section, I highlight study limitations. 
Finally, I offer recommendations for future research and conclude this study. 
Overview of Study 
 Research has suggested Nevada is deficient in meeting its educated workforce needs. 
Policy scholars (NCPPHE, 2005; Richardson, Bracco, Callan, & Finney, 1999) have contended 
state higher education governance entities built for other times and other public purposes may 
crowd out attention to urgent public priorities. The state of Nevada has maintained its single 
state-level higher education governance system largely intact since its creation in 1864 despite 
policy scholars’ call for change. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the 
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework 
of punctuated equilibrium theory, which may provide useful information to Nevada’s state 
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policymakers as they seek to address their educated workforce needs via postsecondary 
governance reform. This study sought to explore the Nevada legislative policymaking process, 
why policy actors responded as they did and the context in which they responded, by examining 
the life cycle of three unique higher education governance reform bills. The primary research 
question guiding this study was: how has the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process 
facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education governance entity? A secondary 
question asked: how is the legislative policymaking process of the ongoing higher education 
governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or different from the process 
that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331, two former higher 
education governance reform bills that were not passed? Interviews with 12 policy actors and a 
review of over 150 public documents revealed three overarching themes: (1) public support of 
AJR 11 was insufficient to overcome a structure-induced equilibrium created by the Nevada 
Constitution; (2) the policy solution AB 331 offered was too extreme and complex to garner 
legislative support; and (3) perchance, unconventional tactics AJR 5 cosponsors employed in the 
legislative policymaking process of AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation 
that ultimately reforms Nevada’s higher education governance entity. 
Answers to Research Questions 
 Legislative policymaking is both an art and a science with many stakeholders, interest 
groups, and citizens seeking to influence the legislative policy process and policy outcomes 
(Hillman et al., 2015). In the case of Nevada, legislative policymaking of AJR 11 and AB 331 
resulted in rejection of both bills. However, AJR 5 policymaking continues and the bill’s fate 
will be determined in November 2020 when Nevada citizens vote on its ballot measure. Thus, 
findings associated with AJR 11 and AB 331 offer answers to my primary research question: 
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How has the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of 
the statewide higher education governance entity? The finding associated with AJR 5 enables a 
cross-case analysis to answer my secondary question: How is the legislative policymaking 
process of the ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, 
similar to and/or different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and 
Assembly Bill 331, two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed? 
AJR 11 
 AJR 11 primarily illustrates how the Nevada Constitution, established in 1864, created a 
structure-induced equilibrium, facilitating the preservation of Nevada’s statewide higher 
education governance entity known as the Board of Regents. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have 
suggested a codifying structure, such as a state Constitution, can firmly establish a policy venue, 
or decision-making body, making future policy change unlikely. As legal analyst Mr. Powers 
testified, framers of the Nevada Constitution dedicated a slice of sovereign power to the Board of 
Regents. That narrow carve out from the Executive Branch ascribed to the board control and 
management of internal affairs of the State University. Thus, the Constitution squarely placed a 
considerable portion of public postsecondary education policymaking in the hands of regents. 
This suggests the framers’ intent was to insulate the State University from political intrusion. As 
academic scholars (Glenny, 1959; McLendon, 2003b; Tandberg, 2013) have pointed out, a main 
reason state higher education governance entities were initiated was to serve as a buffer between 
academic institutions and the state. More importantly, the constitutional framers’ inclusion of the 
Board of Regents suggests their preference for incremental policy change rather than rapid 
punctuation. Democratic theorists would likely agree structures often serve to impose stability 
and check momentary passions of the people (Breunig & Koski, 2012).  
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 The Nevada Constitution also bestowed upon its citizens power to vote for their regent 
representatives, essentially making Nevada voters key policymakers in the higher education 
policy domain. Research has suggested existing structures may channel policymakers’ actions 
along established policy paths, reinforcing policy stasis (Wilford, 1994). I argue this equally 
applies to citizen policymakers, especially when their voting rights are at stake. Commenting on 
AJR 11, an interviewee also suggested, once it is established that public representative positions 
are elected, it is hard to change that because people see it as taking away a right that they have. 
This insinuates voters are indispensable allies when seeking a constitutional amendment. 
  Besides highlighting the Constitution’s role in preserving Nevada’s statewide higher 
education governance entity, AJR 11 also shows how absence of both, widespread support and a 
public education campaign in favor of AJR 11, and to a lesser extent media’s push to vote ‘no’ 
on Ballot Question No. 9, inhibited public adoption of AJR 11 and further buttressed the 
structure-induced equilibrium. In Nevada, constitutional change is a lengthy five-year process. 
First, an amendment must past two consecutive Sessions and then voters must approve it.  
Consequently, sustained momentum is imperative to increase the likelihood of policy adoption. 
As postsecondary literature acknowledges, a governor can play an influential role in the 
legislative policymaking process (Hendrickson et al., 2013; Hillman et al., 2015). Governor 
Guinn’s backing, along with sufficient negotiations across party aisles, helped Assemblywoman 
Giunchigliani triumphantly push AJR 11 through the legislature. However, that level of sustained 
effort was absent in the months leading up to the ballot measure vote as Assemblywoman 
Giunchigliani pursued another office, and no other group or individual stepped up to lend 
support. Mintrom and Norman (2009) have contended, a policy entrepreneur or advocate is often 
needed to promote policy adoption. Similarly, Kingdon (2003) has suggested a policy 
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entrepreneur, who invests time, money, and resources may drive policy change. In addition to the 
entrepreneur’s role, elevated media attention may induce policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2009). However, AJR 11 suggests the media encouraged policy stasis by espousing a ‘no’ vote 
on Ballot Question No. 9. Ultimately, voters agreed. Thus, the legislative policymaking process 
of AJR 11 facilitated the preservation of Nevada’s statewide postsecondary governance entity.    
AB 331 
 AB 331 epitomizes how legislative policymakers’ portrayal of a policy image, including 
its problems and solutions, resulted in policy stasis, facilitating the preservation of Nevada’s 
statewide higher education governance entity. Rochefort and Cobb (1994) have noted the way 
problems are presented and defined serve to explain, describe, recommend, and mostly persuade. 
A former legislator suggested policymakers understood the positive intent of AB 331 and agreed 
with the funding inequities community colleges faced. Likewise, two sitting college presidents’ 
testimony reflected AB 331’s positive intentions, despite also expressing opposition to the bill. 
However, legislative policymakers recognized “breaking off” community colleges was a solution 
too extreme in terms of costs and likelihood of success in resolving AB 331’s problems. As 
Zahariadis (2003) has indicated and AB 331 revealed, people are generally loss averse. In other 
words, policymakers dislike losing more than they like winning (Zahariadis, 2003).  
 The complexity of the solution AB 331 offered further illustrates how the policy image 
promoted policy stability. Zahariadis (2003) has contended a simpler policy image can gain more 
credibility because policymakers often acknowledge and debate only a few dimensions of any 
given policy. Assemblyman Hansen insinuated the complexity of AB 331 as he selectively 
introduced what he considered pertinent features of the bill’s 325 sections. In highlighting the 
Articulation and Transfer Board, Assemblyman Hansen unintentionally simplified the policy 
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image to a single dimension that legislators soon discovered could be implemented under the 
existing governance structure without adoption of AB 331. As Baumgartner and Jones (2009) 
have contended, no single policymaker is in a position to guarantee his solution will be adopted 
even if the government decides to focus on solving a problem. 
 When one considers policy image, one must also examine policy venue (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009). AB 331 demonstrates how a policy subsystem combined with issue specialists 
impacted the legislative policymaking process and perpetuated the status quo. As previously 
noted, the Nevada Constitution securely established the Board of Regents as a statewide policy 
subsystem responsible for public higher education decision-making. AB 331 revealed 
consequential negotiations that occurred behind the scenes between regents and college 
presidents likely prevented the bill from making the legislature’s decision-making agenda. An 
interviewee disclosed community colleges gained power within the system, which she suggested 
was the reason why college presidents were okay with AB 331 dying. According to Baumgartner 
and Jones (2009) issue specialists are advantaged in their ability to favorably portray an issue to 
non-specialists. By virtue of their position and academic expertise, college presidents are 
considered issue specialists in the higher education policy domain. AB 331 suggests the four in 
situ college presidents cogently portrayed their bill opposition, persuading legislators to bypass 
AB 331 and effectively sealing the bill’s demise. Thus, the failure of AB 331 reinforced the 
preservation of Nevada’s statewide postsecondary governance entity. 
AJR 5 
 As depicted in Table 3, the legislative policymaking process of AJR 5 mostly differs 
from the policymaking of AJR 11 and AB 331. Although all three bills sought higher education 
governance reform, only AJR 11 and AJR 5 proposed constitutional amendments, insinuating 
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similar policy processes. However, other than the fact that both bills shared bipartisan support, 
their policymaking processes, along with the policymaking process of  AB 331, largely contrast.  
 
Table 3  
Comparison of Legislative Policymaking Features Across Bills 
 AJR 11 AB 331 AJR 5 
Policy 
Images 
Problem Politicization of BOR & cost of BOR 
Inefficient & 
inequitable system for 
community colleges  
NSHE’s unacceptable 
behavior, legislature’s 




Blended board with 












Support Legislature Former college presidents 
Legislature, Vegas 
Chamber, The Lincy 
Institute, Council for 
a Better Nevada 
Opposition 
Citizen lobbyists, 
chancellor, BOR, & 
media 
Legislature & in situ 
college presidents BOR & NFA 
Policy Outcome Public rejected Legislature rejected Remains undecided 
Policy Reform Goals Clear Clear Unknown 
Political Climate Bipartisan Not voted on Bipartisan 
 
 
 Unlike AJR 11 and AB 331, whose legislative policymaking resulted in the preservation 
of Nevada’s public postsecondary governance structure, AJR 5 policymaking is ongoing and its 
fate will be determined in November 2020 when Nevada citizens vote on the bill. AJR 5  
underscores the invaluable role of political entrepreneurs in the legislative policymaking 
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process. Herweg, Zahariadis, and Zohlnhöfer (2018) have contended the formal leadership 
positions of political entrepreneurs uniquely allow them to further a policy proposal from inside 
the government and work for its adoption. Similar to Assemblywoman Giunchigliani’s 
sponsorship of AJR 11, AJR 5 cosponsors, Senator Woodhouse and Assemblyman Anderson, 
were pivotal in mobilizing sufficient legislative support in two consecutive Sessions. However, 
unlike the approach AJR 11’s sponsor used, AJR 5 cosponsors’ unconventional tactics may also  
favorably sway voters in November 2020, ultimately inducing for the first time, a policy 
punctuation and higher education governance reform. 
 Kingdon (1984, 2003) has suggested the policymaking process is largely determined by 
the artful connection of problems and solutions (as cited in Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). In 
contrast to the extreme complex solution Assemblyman Hansen designed into AB 331, AJR 5 
cosponsors cleverly crafted a policy solution to explicitly exclude any public loss of voting 
rights. AJR 5 also appeared to benefit both legislature and faculty, thus aiding legislators’ 
adoption of the bill. As Zahariadis (2003) has indicated, and as both AJR 11 and AB 331 
revealed, voters and legislators are generally loss averse. This suggests AJR 5 cosponsors 
recognized the importance of language in advantageously framing the bill’s problems and 
solutions. In addition, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have argued when people view a problem 
as stemming from government or human sources (versus nature), they are more likely to demand 
government action. Bill sponsors across AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5 similarly exposed the 
Board of Regents and NSHE as the source of Nevada’s higher education woes. However, AJR 5 
cosponsors’ exclusive and repeated use of historical court case analogies during committee 
hearings (Taliaferro, 1994) likely helped establish a reference from which legislators could 
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favorably assess problems AJR 5 aimed to resolve (as cited in Zahariadis, 2003). Thus, the 
cosponsors neatly aligned AJR 5’s problem and proposed solution. 
 The most striking difference across the three bills seems to be AJR 5 cosponsors’ salami 
tactic, or manipulation of sequential decision-making, which presumably facilitated the 
legislature’s passage of AJR 5 (Zahariadis, 2003). Multiple testimony and discussion in the 2019 
Session illuminated the cosponsors’ salami tactic. Especially insightful was Mr. Anderson’s 
opposition to SB 354, Senator Woodhouse’s trailer bill to AJR 5, which would have removed 
citizens’ right to vote for some regents and most likely would have caused voters to reject AJR 5 
in November 2020. Zahariadis (2003) has argued the ability to control the legislature’s decision-
making agenda rests only with highly placed entrepreneurs. Despite his return as a private 
citizen, Mr. Anderson seemed to still carry significant legislative influence in 2019. Thus, it is 
likely he will continue to invest his time and resources, advocating for AJR 5 until voters decide. 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 Exactly what will be the fate of AJR 5 remains uncertain, and predicting voter turnout is 
always difficult, especially in light of the recent coronavirus pandemic and what will no doubt be 
a politically-charged Presidential Election year. To be sure, the policymaking process of AJR 5 
specifically, has policy and practice implications for Nevada’s postsecondary governance entity 
and Nevada’s higher education system, which Senator Woodhouse aptly testified belongs to all 
Nevadans. Consequently, it is prudent to examine these implications given the high stakes and 
potential consequences for all Nevadans. 
 Theoretically, passage of AJR 5 will further burden the Nevada Legislature as legislators 
strive “to provide by statute for the governance, control, and management of the State 
University.” Similar to Nevada’s Board of Regents, the State Legislature is comprised of elected, 
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part-time representatives, who may or may not have direct higher education experience. The 
literature has suggested most legislators are constrained by the breadth of their duties and are 
challenged to sustain deep involvement in any single area (Lingenfelter et al., 2008). As two 
interview participants articulated, it may turn out to be a case of “be careful what you ask for.” 
Additionally, if in fact SB 354 is a harbinger of what lies ahead for Nevada’s higher education 
governance entity, Governor Sisolak’s role in higher education governance will certainly expand 
to include appointing some regents. Moreover, his prior regent experience suggests his greater 
presence in the higher education policy domain. As a former President of the State Higher 
Education Executive Officers agency and his colleagues at the Associations of Governing Board 
have pointed out, it is both onerous and unwise for legislators and governors to try to directly 
control higher education (Lingenfelter et al., 2008). Rather, the path to success demands clarity 
of purpose along with appropriate inclusion of those most impacted by policy change. 
 Exactly how Nevada’s higher education governance entity might be reformed should 
AJR 5 pass is ultimately a decision for future legislatures. When I asked interview participants, 
“If the public passes AJR 5, how do you see Nevada’s postsecondary governance changing,” all 
12 participants expressed their unabashed bewilderment because AJR 5 only removes the Board 
of Regents’ constitutional authority and enshrines academic freedom. It is void of any policy 
specifics. Distinguished postsecondary governance scholar, Aims McGuinness (2015, p. 2) has 
offered seven guidelines for states who seek higher education governance reorganization. Here I 
offer a condensed version of his guidelines, which may aid Nevada’s state policymakers as they 
seek to address the state’s educated workforce needs via postsecondary governance reform.  
(1) Focus first on ends, not means. 
(2) Be explicit about the specific problems that are the catalysts for the reorganization. 
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(3) Ask if reorganization is the only or most effective means for addressing the problems. 
(4) Weigh the costs of reorganization against the short- and long-term benefits. 
(5) Recognize that a good system balances state needs with college and university needs.  
(6) Distinguish between state coordination and institutional governance. 
(7) Examine the total policy structure and process rather than only the formal 
postsecondary education structure. 
Ultimately, as McGuinness (2015) has suggested, the challenge is to ensure the postsecondary 
governance entity and higher education policies foster proper institutional autonomy and 
institutional responsiveness to public priorities. Similarly, Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have 
suggested a postsecondary governance structure may help or hinder educational progress, 
however, if key ingredients (i.e., strategic vision, shared responsibility, leadership, professional 
capacity, trust, focus on priorities, the availability of solid information, and the ability to build 
consensus) are absent, changing the statewide structure cannot accomplish much. 
Implications for Theory 
 The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s 
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium 
theory. Punctuated equilibrium theory suggests the policymaking process is defined by long 
periods of stability and incremental policy change. Occasionally, the process is marked by major 
policy change as policy images are redefined and issues shift from monopolistic policy venues, 
or policy subsystems, into the larger macropolitical arena. Findings from this study support the 
theory and bolster several of Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (2009, pp. 238-243) most important 
findings based on their extensive research across many policy domains. Specifically, AJR 11 
illustrates how “Policy subsystems are often institutionalized as ‘structure-induced equilibria,’ in 
 106 
which a prevailing policy understanding dominates.” According to the policy scholars, equilibria 
can be changed only by changing the institutions themselves. AJR 11 also shows how governor 
involvement can be decisive in legislative policymaking. AB 331 lends credence to 
Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (2009) finding, “Problems and solutions are linked but are considered 
separately.” Thus, policymaking may result in policy stasis rather than change. Last, AJR 5 
underscores the entrepreneur’s advocacy role and bolsters the scholars’ finding, “Intervention of 
the macropolitical institutions generally reinforces the possibilities of rapid change.”     
Limitations 
 While a few policy scholars have argued against single-state case studies for their lack of 
generalizability, others have contended it is “soundness of theory and rigor of analysis, rather 
than the number of states, that makes research valid and important” (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 
2002, p. 411). Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002) have also noted scholars of state policymaking 
“should be interested in not only what happens across states, but also what happens within them” 
(pp. 412-413). Ultimately, the application of policy theory to a single state like Nevada 
facilitated a more complex, contextual understanding of the state’s legislative policymaking 
process and provided support for the theoretical concepts of Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (1993, 
2009) punctuated equilibrium theory.  
 A particular challenge I faced during this study was contacting Nevada legislators via 
their public email address; some did not respond since the legislature was not in session. In some 
instances, former legislators were deceased. Additionally, some interview participants declined 
the interview or opted not to answer some interview questions because of their position and 
ongoing AJR 5 legislation. Another aspect that likely tempered some participants’ interview 
responses was my graduate assistantship at The Lincy Institute, which I held for duration of this 
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study and disclosed at the start of each interview. Representatives of The Lincy Institute have 
previously testified in support of AJR 5 and other past postsecondary governance reform 
legislation. On the contrary, my position may have facilitated some participants’ candor.  
Future Research 
 The findings of this study suggests several areas worthy of further research to better 
understand the legislative policymaking process associated with higher education governance 
reform in Nevada. While this study closely examined the role of legislators in the policymaking 
process of higher education governance reform, Moe (1990) has suggested the fundamental 
question in understanding why structural choices turn out as they do is: how do interest groups 
decide what kind of structures they want politicians to provide (as cited in Lowry, 2007)? Thus, 
an examination of interest groups associated with Nevada’s higher education governance reform 
legislation may offer relevant information about the legislative policymaking process and 
potentially provide insight about the future of postsecondary education in Nevada. Another 
question worthy of investigation is how the assignment of bills to specific committees may 
influence higher education governance reform policy outcomes. Both AJR 11 and AJR 5 were 
assigned to the Legislative Operations and Election Committees, rather than the Education 
Committees despite implications for higher education. Similarly, a future study might examine 
how ballot measure language and the sequencing of questions influence public policy outcomes. 
More specifically, how is language and information from enrolled bills, along with public 
testimony, conveyed in ballot measure questions and how does that affect policy outcomes? An 
investigation of AJR 5’s ballot measure specifically, may further illuminate Nevada’s legislative 
policymaking associated with higher education governance reform. 
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 As previously indicated, AJR 5 policymaking is ongoing. However, should AJR 5 pass, a 
number of research areas are possible. For example, who will decide the next steps in the 
postsecondary reform process and how will they make that decision? How will the governor’s 
expanded role impact Nevada’s higher education outcomes? How will the legislature balance 
institutional accountability and autonomy? How will the legislature define academic freedom? 
What will be the unintended consequences of the bill and who will be impacted? How will the 
buffering role of the Board of Regents change and how will that impact Nevada’s postsecondary 
institutions? What will be the role of the legislature in shared governance? How will governance 
reform shape Nevada’s educational outcomes and achieve the state’s workforce needs? To be 
sure, the possible policy implementation and evaluation research questions seem limitless.  
Conclusion 
 Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have theorized policymaking process is often defined by 
long periods of stability and incremental policy change. Sometimes, however, the process is 
marked by major policy change. The findings of this study primarily illustrate how Nevada’s 
legislative policymaking process of two different higher education governance reform bills 
resulted in policy stability. Additionally, they suggest the unconventional legislative 
policymaking associated with AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation that 
ultimately reforms Nevada’s higher education governance entity. Of course, one can never be 
certain of a policy’s outcome until it happens. Nevada citizens will ultimately determine the 
outcome of AJR 5.  
 Nevada’s newest slogan, “What happens here, only happens here,” proudly boasts the  
state’s uniqueness. Indeed, Nevada’s statewide postsecondary governance entity mirrors this 
uniqueness in its regent election process. However, the Board of Regents’ constitutional 
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authority is not uncommon, rather it is purposeful. And as Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have 
reported, “There is no punctuated equilibrium process leading toward inevitable progress” (p. 
xxv). Consequently, as Nevada’s legislative policymakers and higher education stakeholders 
seek to reform the statewide higher education governance entity, they may be wise to follow 
McGuinness’ reform guidelines and heed the message from Lingenfelter and his associates 
(2008) that without key ingredients, such as strategic vision, shared responsibility, trust, and 




















State Postsecondary Governance Reform from 2000 to 2020 
Status/ 
Citation 









Amends rule so that Board of Regents is 
replaced by the Board of Governors. 
Members are appointed by Governor subject 







Louisiana Limit to State 
Education Board 
and Board of 
Regents 
Membership 
To provide for term limits for members of 
the Board of Regents, and other state boards. 
A person who has served for more than two 
and one-half terms in three consecutive terms 
shall not be appointed or elected to the 
succeeding term; and to provide for a limit 








Revises the higher education coordinating 
board. Effective July 22, 2007, the Executive 
Director of the HECB is appointed by the 
Governor from a list of three names 








Revises the membership of the Board of 
Governors of the California State 
Community Colleges to include 12 members 
appointed by the Governor with advice and 





Kansas Higher Education 
Coordination Act 
The bill specifies that the State Board of 
Regents will serve as the representative of 
the public postsecondary education system 









Creates Florida Education Governance 
Reorganization Act of 2000; Creates a 
governance system that deals with K-20 
education. The new board will oversee 
Florida's education system from 
Kindergarten to grad school. 
 
Note. Adapted from “Education Commission of the States (ECS) State Policy Database,” 
retrieved on April 23, 2020. 
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Appendix B 
Summary of State Governance Models 
Board Type Number of States States 
Statewide Coordinating Board 20 Alabama, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia 
and Washington 
 
Statewide Governing Board 8 Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Kansas, Montana, Nevada, 
North Dakota and Rhode 
Island 
 
System/Institutional Boards 22 Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
Utah, Vermont 













Joint Resolutions to Change Nevada Board of Regents 
Year Bill What It Proposed Result 
1957, 
1959 
AJR 12 Appointment of regents 1959: Passed Assembly; not 




SJR 10 Appointment of regents 1961: Not reported from 
committee in Senate 
1961, 
1963 
SJR 8 Appointment of regents and increase number of 
regents to nine 
1963: Died in Senate 
1963 SJR 12 Appointment of regents Passed Senate; not reported 
from Assembly committee 
1967 SJR 20 Place University of Nevada under control of 
Legislation to be exercised through a Board of 
Regents appointed by governor 
Passed Senate; Died in 
Assembly 
1969 AJR 31 Create two separate elected Board of Regents for 
two state universities 
Not reported from 
Assembly committee 
1969 AJR 41 Appointment of regents by governor Passed Assembly but died 
on third reading in Senate 
1975 AJR 42 Legislature control Board of Regents Not reported from 
Assembly committee  
1979 SJR 12 Appointment of regents and create 5-member 
Board of Trustees for system of community 
colleges 
Passed Senate; Not reported 
from Assembly committee 
1981 AJR 22 Appointment of regents Failed in Assembly 
1983 AJR 3 Create separate Board of Regents for community 
colleges 
Failed in Assembly 
1985 AJR 21 Appointment of regents Failed in Assembly 
1986 - 
2002 






AJR 11 Governor appoint some regents and some remain 
by election (and specify number and terms of 
members) 
2006: Voters failed to 
approve 
2007 SJR 4 Legislature to provide for organization and regent 
duties; regent appointment by governor 
Supposed to return 2009 




AJR 5 Remove Board of Regents from constitution Passed both houses 2017 & 
2019; public votes 2020 
 
Note. Adapted from “Background Information Higher Education Governance,” by C. Stonefield, 










This is a research study. 
 
I'd like to schedule a 20-30 minute call with you to discuss your role in Nevada’s state-level 
policymaking process as it pertains to higher education governance reform legislation. 
  
I am a PhD student completing my dissertation at UNLV in the Educational Psychology and 
Higher Education Department. I am conducting research on Nevada’s legislative policymaking 
process associated with postsecondary governance reform. You are receiving this email because 
of your knowledge and experience on this topic.  
 
The purpose of this qualitative case study is to understand the preservation of Nevada’s higher 
education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium theory. 
The focus is on examining the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors 
responded as they did and the context in which they responded. This research is being completed 
under the supervision of Dr. Vicki Rosser, a full professor in the Department of Educational 
Psychology and Higher Education at UNLV. This study has been approved as an exempt project 
under UNLV IRB board. 
  
Interviewees will be asked to share their experiences with Nevada’s state-level policymaking 
process as it pertains to higher education governance reform legislation. They will not be 
compensated for their time. 
  
I appreciate your assistance and alternatively, if you are not available do you have suggestions of 










Appendix E  
Interview Protocol 
Date/time of interview: 
Place: 
Interviewee: 
Position of interviewee: 
 
Introduce myself, confirm informed consent, and ask approval to tape-record interview. Briefly 
describe study—this research examines how the legislative policymaking process has contributed 
to the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity (Board of Regents), 
specifically studying 3 higher education governance reform bills (AJR 5, AB 331, and AJR 11). 
 
Policy & Political Climate  
1. How has the political climate in Nevada changed over the 21st century?  
2. How would you describe the climate surrounding higher education governance reform? 
3. To what extent do you think higher education governance reform is a partisan issue? 
Policy Images  
4. From your perspective, what problem was/is the bill trying to resolve? 
5. What made the bill a priority for consideration (any specific event/incidence)?  
6. How would you characterize the tone of the press coverage surrounding the bill? 
Policy Venues 
7. What individuals or groups initiated the push for change? 
8. What individuals or groups supported the change? 
9. What strategies or tactics did they use? 
10. What individuals or groups opposed the change? 
11. What strategies or tactics did they use to block change? 
Policy Outcome 
12. If the public passes AJR 5, how do you see postsecondary governance changing? 
 
13. Is there anything else you would like to share with me? Is there anyone else you would 
recommend I interview? 
 
Thank them for participating in this interview. Assure her/him of confidentiality of responses. 









Department of Educational Psychology and Higher Education 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
TITLE OF STUDY:  
Preserving Nevada’s Higher Education Governance Entity: A Case Study  
INVESTIGATOR(S): Vicki Rosser, (702) 895-1432; Deanna Cooper, (702) 361-1881 
For questions regarding the rights of research subjects, any complaints, or comments regarding 
the manner in which the study is being conducted, contact the UNLV Office of Research 




Purpose of the Study 
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this qualitative case study is to 
understand the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the 
theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium theory.  
 
Participants 
You are being asked to participate in the study because you fit these criteria: you have 
knowledge and/or experience in the state-level policymaking process as it pertains to higher 
education governance reform legislation in Nevada. 
 
Procedures  
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to do the following: participate in 
interviews to share your experiences in the state-level policymaking process as it pertains to 
higher education governance reform legislation in Nevada. 
 
Benefits of Participation  
There may not be direct benefits to you as a participant in this study. However, we hope to learn 
how the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the 
statewide higher education governance entity. 
 
Risks of Participation  
There are risks involved in all research studies. This study may include only minimal risks. Over 
the course of participating in the interview you may become uncomfortable answering questions 
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and may refuse to answer. You will not be excluded from the research project if you decide not 
to answer questions which make you feel uncomfortable.  
 
Cost /Compensation  
There may not be financial cost to you to participate in this study. The study will take anywhere 
from 20 minutes to one hour of your time.  You will not be compensated for your time.    
 
Confidentiality  
All information gathered in this study will be kept as confidential as possible. No reference will 
be made in written or oral materials that could link you to this study as an interview participant 
unless approved by you. To the extent that your role is a matter of public record, I may reference 
your name without disclosing you as an interview participant. All records will be stored in a 
locked facility at UNLV for 3 years after completion of the study.  After the storage time the 
information gathered will be deleted from the computer.  
 
Voluntary Participation  
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate in this study or in any 
part of this study. You may withdraw at any time without prejudice to your relations with 
UNLV. You are encouraged to ask questions about this study at the beginning or any time during 
the research study. 
 
Participant Consent:  
I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study.  I have been able to ask 
questions about the research study.  I am at least 18 years of age.  A copy of this form has been 
given to me. 
 
             
Signature of Participant                                             Date  
 
        
Participant Name (Please Print)                                               
 
 
I agree to be audiotaped for the purpose of this research study. 
 
             
Signature of Participant                                             Date  
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Appendix H  
Case Histories 
King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533 (1948)  
 There, the Legislature enacted a bill to create the Advisory Board of Regents. The 
Advisory Board of Regents was essentially a shadow board that had all rights and 
privileges of the full elected Board of Regents, except the advisory board could not vote 
on anything that the full Board of Regents could vote on. The Nevada Supreme Court 
found this unprecedented, unusual, and unique special legislation. They struck it down. 
The fear of the court was that the Legislature would then create shadow bodies to provide 
advice to all the Executive Branch officers, so there would be an advisory board to the 
Governor and an advisory board to the Secretary of State, and so forth. Because of the 
unique nature of the advisory board in King, it was struck down as unconstitutional by 
invading the sovereign slice of power that the Board of Regents had. However, in that 
case, the Nevada Supreme Court made clear that the Board's power to control the internal 
management and affairs at the university was subject to the traditional legislative rights 
that are recognized by the power of the Legislature to pass laws of general application. 
(“Nevada Assembly Committee on Legislative Operations and Elections Minutes,” 2017, 
March 2, pp. 7-8 ) 
State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 144, 147-48 (1953) 
 In that case, the Board of Regents terminated a professor after a hearing for cause. The 
professor then brought an action for judicial review, saying that the Board of Regents did 
not have cause to terminate his tenured status as a professor. In that case, which is typical 
for the Board of Regents, they relied on the King case and argued that the Board of 
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Regents, because it is a constitutional body, is beyond any control of the courts. 
Obviously, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected that proposition. However, it gives you 
an example of how the Board of Regents uses the King case to base its decision-making 
because it believes it gives us this large slice of sovereign power when it is actually a 
very narrow slice of sovereign power. In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court found the 
Board of Regents was subject to judicial review and that the case could be reviewed by 
the courts to determine whether the Board of Regents properly dismissed that professor 
for cause. (“Nevada Assembly Committee on Legislative Operations and Elections 
Minutes,” 2019, February 21, p. 8 ) 
Board of Regents v. Oakley, 637 P.2d 1199 (1981) 
 In that case, the university adopted a policy requiring professors to retire at the age of 70; 
however, the general law in Nevada prohibits age discrimination. The professors who did 
not want to retire said that the university did not have the power to dismiss them based on 
their age policy. In this case, based on King, the university argued that it had unique 
constitutional status that gives it virtual autonomy and immunity from the state's policy 
established by the Legislature. The Nevada Supreme Court flatly rejected that 
proposition. What the Nevada Supreme Court found is a generally applicable law of 
statewide application does apply to the university, as long as it does not unreasonably 
interfere with the internal management of the university. In that case, the court found that 
the general age discrimination policy did not unreasonably interfere with the university's 
age practices; therefore, the university was subject to that general age discrimination law. 
(“Nevada Assembly Committee on Legislative Operations and Elections Minutes,” 2017, 
March 2, p. 8 ) 
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